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ABSTRACT 
Since Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, it has 
fought in one major war and several skirmishes, and has frequently used military force in 
the form of coercive diplomacy. The pattern of China’s use of force, however, has 
steadily declined over time. At the same time, China’s domestic politics have reformed 
from allowing one person high amounts of consolidated policy-making power to more 
institutionalized consensus-based governance. Do the changes in domestic political 
structure have a pacifying effect on China’s foreign policy? In other words, is it a cause 
of China’s declining use of force? Through analyzing China’s responses to the Korean 
War, the three Taiwan Strait Crises (1954–1955, 1958, and 1995–1996), and the period 
of cross-strait relations in 1999–2002, this thesis finds that China’s reactions to similar 
types of threats have become more pacific over time, in part because of its shift to 
consensus-based governance, but that another major explaining factor is China’s 
increased economic interdependence with the United States. The relationship that this 
thesis describes between China’s domestic political-power consolidation and the 
aggressiveness of its foreign policy is especially relevant as the current leader of China, 
Xi Jinping, has more centralized political power than any PRC leader since Mao. 
American China watchers and policy makers should be cognizant to whether Xi 
accumulates more power, or shows signs of diverging from the institutionalized reforms, 
as it may have an effect on the PRC’s foreign policy assertiveness. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, it has 
participated in a major multinational war, multiple territorial conflicts, and several lower 
uses of force. The PRC was involved in 27 interstate wars or clashes (as defined by the 
Correlates of War) from 1949–1976, under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Deng 
Xiaoping, Mao’s successor, presided over 11 interstate wars or clashes during his rule 
from 1978 to 1989. Deng stepped down as the chairman of the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1989, and from then until 
2010, China has not been in a single interstate war and has had only two clashes.1 The 
evidence demonstrates a clear pattern of reduced aggressiveness over time. 
What has caused this pattern in China’s use of force? Some of the explanations 
include increased economic interdependence, the resolution of most of its territorial 
disputes, and the Chinese Communist Party’s political and economic reforms that shifted 
China away from Communist ideology.2 For Mao’s China, there is also significant 
scholarship work about him as an individual leader having significant influence over the 
PRC’s decisions to use force, but scholarship on the importance of the individual leader 
is entirely absent for any of China’s post-1989 clashes. This trend in the literature is no 
mistake: as David Lampton notes, “The PRC has gone from leaders who had personal 
and experiential credibility to leaders who are constrained by collective decision making, 
by term limits, by evolving norms, by the boundaries of the permissible partially defined 
                                                 
1 Glenn Palmer et al., “The MID4 Data Set: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science. The current limit on the Correlates of War database is 2010.  
2 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial 
Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 314–15; Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: 
Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International Security 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997–1998): 36–73; Charles Glaser, 
“Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 80–91; Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (January/February 
2005): 46–50; Thomas G. Moore and Yang Dixia, “Empowered and Restrained: Chinese Foreign Policy in 
the Age of Economic Interdependence,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era 
of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 191–229; John Garver, 
China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 4–5. 
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by ‘public opinion,’ and, in part, by their own technocratic and relatively educated 
characters.”3 Over time, the role of the individual leader has become less powerful and 
more constrained within the CCP. These domestic political changes correlate with the 
decreasing trend in the PRC’s uses of force. Is there a cause and effect?  
For the purposes of this thesis, Mao’s period of rule from 1949 to 1976 is deemed 
the paramount leader period, as he enjoyed unparalleled prestige, policy-making power, 
and influence while serving as the leader of the PRC.4 Deng Xiaoping was a transitional 
leader who exhibited some strongman characteristics, but was not nearly as paramount as 
Mao, so this thesis is not considering conflicts during his time. After Jiang Zemin became 
the CMC and General Secretary of the CCP in 1989, the supreme leaders of the PRC 
have had distinctively less prestige and political strength, and have governed more 
through consensus with other CCP elites and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).5 
Some of these changes in leader strength have been a function of the leaders themselves -
Jiang Zemin and his successors not having been among the revolutionary founders of the 
PRC like Mao or Deng- but most of the difference seems to be from deliberate reforms 
within the CCP to prevent Mao-level control where policy is entirely captured by one 
person.  
This thesis considers 1989 until the present as the consensus period. In order to 
isolate changes in the role of leaders and exclude changes in leaders during the consensus 
period, the thesis will only look at Jiang Zemin’s tenure as the CMC and CCP chair from 
1989–2002 and not Hu Jintao or Xi Jinping’s rule.  
The Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) database lends more 
insight into the differences in China’s uses of force between the paramount leader and 
consensus periods: from 1949–1976, China was involved in an average of 3.63 MIDs/
year, while China in 1989–2010 had 2.57 MIDs/year.6 Furthermore, when including only 
                                                 
3 David M. Lampton, Following the Leader: Ruling China from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 73. 
4 Ibid., 40–41, 70–72. 
5 Linda Jakobsen and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 26, 
page 27. http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf. 
6 Palmer et al., “The MID4 Data Set.” 
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MIDs that escalated beyond just threats to use force, the 1949–1976 experienced 2.33 
MIDs/year, and 1989–2010 only 0.86 MIDs/year. These two sets of numbers demonstrate 
that the China in the later period was both less prone to be involved in MIDs, and the 
MIDs that it did participate in ended with less aggressive or escalatory actions. The 
consensus period has correlated with both fewer and lower uses of military force 
compared to the paramount leader period.  
This thesis will compare the 1950–1953 Korean War and 1954 and 1958 Taiwan 
Strait Crises (TSC) with the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and cross-strait relations 
from 1999–20027 to answer the question: Did the difference in the role of the individual 
leader in China between 1950–1958 and 1989–2002 have an effect on its use of military 
force? In addition, has China’s increased economic interdependence, especially with the 
United States, had an effect on its use of military force? I argue that China’s foreign 
policy during paramount leader period was subject to the perceptions of Mao, who 
strongly favored military force as a solution to political problems, and as a result were 
larger and more frequent than they would have been otherwise. Under Mao, China’s EI 
was quite low, especially with non-Communist countries, and would not likely have been 
a check on aggressiveness. On the other hand, from 1989 to 2002, consensus-based 
governing restrained China’s foreign policy in times when it might have acted more 
assertively otherwise. In addition, economic interdependence, especially with the United 
States and Taiwan, also had a pacifying effect on Beijing’s decision making, serving to 
constrain both when and how China used force in challenging situations. Had the 
consensus period case studies occurred in lower EI or more paramount leader 
circumstances, they might have resulted in China using more military force more often.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
China has experienced a meteoric economic rise since the 1990s, thrusting it into 
the realm of great powers and significant influence in world affairs. China’s economic 
boom has also been accompanied with a substantial military modernization and reform 
                                                 
7 This was a period of significant pro-independence rhetoric from Taiwan that bore similarities to the 
conditions that catalyzed the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
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program. The rise of China has caused significant debate in academic, policy, and 
military circles within the United States on whether it will ascend to world power status 
peacefully or become more assertive as it grows in strength. Starting in the 2010s, U.S. 
strategy documents began to consistently mention China as a potential economic and 
military competitor.  
Many scholars and experts, however, optimistically argue that China’s rise so far 
has been peaceful and cooperative vis-à-vis the United States and the international order, 
and will continue to do so.8  On the other hand, several analysts pessimistically argue that 
China is growing aggressive and more revisionist towards the world order as it gains 
strength and status as a great power.9 As China’s role in the world grows stronger and 
more complex, it will be increasingly imperative for U.S. policy makers, strategists, and 
military leaders to understand the conditions and causes for China to use military force. A 
better understanding of these conditions and causes will help inform U.S. leaders how 
best to deter potential Chinese assertiveness, encourage cooperative behavior between the 
two powers, and avoid destructive conflict. The PRC has undergone significant domestic 
political changes in the seven decades since its creation, and it is important to understand 
how those domestic changes have affected how the PRC uses military force as an element 
of its foreign policy. This thesis demonstrates a link between the changing role of the 
individual leader in the PRC and its use of force, which may have predictive power on 
the likelihood of future Chinese military aggressiveness as the PRC’s domestic politics 
continue to evolve. This is especially relevant as the current Chinese president, Xi 
Jinping has become the most powerful top leader of the PRC since Mao.10 This 
development suggests a possible increase in China’s foreign policy aggressiveness. 
                                                 
8 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 8–9; Goldstein, “Great Expectations,” 36–39; Glaser, “Will 
China’s Rise Lead to War?” 80–81; Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” 46–47. 
9 Goldstein, “Parsing China’s Rise: International Circumstances and National Attributes,” in China’s 
Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 86–87; Aaron L. Friedberg and Robert S. Ross, “Here Be Dragons: Is 
China a Military Threat?” The National Interest 103 (September/October 2009): 19–34; Mearsheimer, 
“China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105 (April 2006): 160–62. 
10 Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping, Seeking to Extend Power, May Bend Retirement Rules,” New York 
Times, March 2, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-retirement-
rules.html. 
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However, this thesis also illustrates that economic interdependence has had a restraining 
effect on China’s use of force. If China’s trade ties continue to remain high, this effect 
may outweigh the influence of one man consolidated political power. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will first cover works on China’s patterns of uses of force. 
As an alternative explanation to the trend in China’s uses of force, the next section looks 
at economic interdependence theory and how it applies to the decreased aggressiveness 
China’s foreign policy. Following that, the review looks at theoretical frameworks for the 
focus of this thesis, mostly centered on the importance of individual leaders and how to 
evaluate or determine their role in their nations’ foreign policies. The last section is on 
the changes in PRC politics, decision-making structures, and leaders. 
1. Patterns in China’s Use of Force 
Many scholars contend China has shown a high willingness to use force, and that 
China’s rise portends a likely clash with the United States.11 The works on China’s 
strategic culture suggest that it is just as willing to use force as another other nation, or 
purport aggressive actions as defensive. Burles, Shulsky, and Christensen (in his earlier 
works) argue that China has shown a propensity to use force even in militarily 
unfavorable situations to achieve a longer term political goal. I group them as an 
opportunist family of theories about China’s use of force.  
On the other hand, Whiting, Johnston, and Fravel generally claim that the PRC 
has settled most of its territorial disputes, and therefore most of its likely sources of 
conflict.12 They can be categorized as a group of cooperative theories about China’s 
military foreign policy. Another group of analysts explains China’s behavior with the 
                                                 
11 Thomas J. Christensen, “Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing’s Use of Force,” in New 
Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), 52; Mark Burles and Abram Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: 
Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 10–14. 
12 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 8–9; Allen Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 3–15; Alastair I. Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate 
Dispute Behaviour 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data,” The China Quarterly, no. 153 (March 1998): 1–
30. 
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lens of ideology, portraying China’s increasingly cooperative foreign policy as a product 
of Mao, Deng, and the CCP’s changing application of Communist ideology. There is also 
a smaller selection of scholarship on Mao’s influence as an individual leader in the PRC, 
but post-Mao individual leader analysis is fairly sparse. The works on ideology are 
closely linked with changes in individual leaders and the domestic political changes in 
the CCP after Deng Xiaoping, so I group the ideology and leader focused work together. 
All of the scholars reviewed here agree that Taiwan is the most probable hotspot for PRC 
military force. 
This body of work demonstrates a significant gap: as the MID data shows, China 
has become less likely to use military force over time, yet almost all of the literature take 
examples of the PRC’s uses of force and analyze why they happened. Fravel and 
Johnston aside, there has not been any work that looks at situations where the PRC was 
likely to use force, but did not, or situations where the PRC was more restrained in its use 
of force than before. For example, the political conditions of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 
1995–1996 were similar in some aspects to the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises, but 
the PRC did not shell any islands or kill any Taiwanese soldiers in 1996 like it did in 
1954 and 1958. 
There is another gap in the analyses of China’s use of force. Most analysis on 
PRC conflicts during the paramount leader period focus on Mao’s role as a leader and his 
clout in determining China’s foreign policy. On the other hand, the reviews covering the 
conflicts in consensus period generally look at the domestic interplay between the PLA, 
CCP elites, and the rise of nationalist ideology. There does not seem to be much 
literature, however, linking how China’s usage of military force has changed as its 
governance has changed between Mao’s rule and the consensus period. This thesis will 
attempt to fill some of that gap through establishing a relationship between the changing 
governance structure in the PRC and its decreased uses of force. If the findings of this 
thesis do establish a causal relationship between consensus-based governing and fewer 
and lower uses of force in the PRC, the conclusion will side with the cooperative theorists 
that China will be peaceful even as it grows in power, unless the current or future PRC 
presidents can consolidate enough political power to become paramount leaders.   
 7 
2. China as a Potentially Aggressive Opportunist 
Thomas Christensen stresses that the PRC has used force when it “perceived an 
opening window of vulnerability or a closing window of opportunity.”13 Christensen 
analyzes China’s decisions to use military force during Mao’s reign as a product of his 
policies. In the post-Mao period, he examines China’s use of force more monolithically. 
A significant observation from “Windows at War” is that because the PRC has shown a 
willingness to use force even when facing more powerful adversaries, U.S. deterrence of 
Chinese assertiveness will require more complex strategies than pure military superiority. 
Another important point is that China is willing to use force to “shape long-term 
trends…rather than to resolve a security problem once and for all.”14 Put in different 
terms, China, at times, has been willing to use force as a signal even if it knows that it 
cannot achieve a military victory. Christensen includes the Korean War and the 1954 and 
1958 Taiwan Strait Crises as examples of using force in windows of opportunity, despite 
military inferiority. Once again, Taiwan is highlighted as the potential hotspot for China-
U.S. relations. Of note is that seven of the eight case studies in Christensen’s piece were 
from Mao’s period, and one was from Deng Xiaoping’s reign. None were from the 
consensus governance period, potentially highlighting the pattern that this thesis is 
exploring. Did consensus governance reduce the propensity for China to seize closing 
political windows of opportunity with military force? 
Mark Burles and Abram Shulsky look at China’s doctrinal writings and history 
and have findings consistent with Christensen’s analysis.15 Burles and Shulsky argue that 
even when facing a stronger opponent, China has demonstrated willingness to use 
military force for political effect, especially with regards to the Taiwan issue, which has 
potentially troubling implications for China’s future behavior.  
Continuing in a mostly unitary state lens, Gerald Segal explores multiple factors 
in China’s use of force as an element of its foreign policy, including geography, history, 
                                                 
13 Christensen, “Windows and War,” 52. 
14 Ibid., 51. 
15 Burles and Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force, 10–14. 
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ideology, and institutions.16 While not coming to a clear conclusion on the most 
important factor for China’s use of force, Segal generally argues that China has used 
force defensively to deter foreign aggression on its territory.17 While Segal examines 
China briefly at the domestic politics level in each case study, he rarely ventures inside 
the state and treats China as a monolithic decision-making entity. 
Johnston looks at the Ming dynasty and argues that China’s historical experience 
up to that point has shaped Chinese strategic culture into an offensive realist one that is 
largely similar to Western realpolitik paradigms.18 Johnston is mostly projecting China’s 
behavior based on old Chinese writings, however, and he wrote this book before his 
quantitative analysis on China’s MIDs, which found China to be less aggressive despite 
its growing power. In his later work, he does not address the difference in findings 
between his two pieces. 
3. Leaders and Ideology in China 
John Garver’s narrative uses the rise and fall of Communist ideology as the 
driving force for China’s foreign policy decisions.19 Garver’s categorizes the history of 
the PRC’s foreign policy in three different periods. The first era was Mao’s reign from 
1949–1976, where China’s foreign relations were shaped by the CCP’s quest to 
consolidate communism. Garver interprets the early conflicts with the United States as a 
product of shoring up domestic and Soviet support for the revolution, and the later U.S. 
rapprochement after Mao came to believe that the Soviet brand of communism was going 
in the wrong direction. The second, Deng Xiaoping’s tenure from 1978–1989, by China’s 
drift away from communist economic principles which led to genuine cooperation with 
the United States. In the third period, from 1990 on, Garver argues that the PRC has 
begun to experience growing domestic and international tensions as it has reformed 
economically, become more interconnected with the world, yet refused to institute liberal 
                                                 
16 Gerald Segal, Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 4. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1–15. 
19 Garver, China’s Quest, 1–2.  
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political changes. These challenges have led the CCP to turn to nationalist ideology as its 
source of legitimacy and power. Garver predicts future tensions between China and 
powerful liberal democracies such as the United States or Japan because they represent 
ideological threats to the survival of the CCP.20 While Garver does not explicitly state it, 
his periods of analysis suggest that changes in individual leaders, and potentially the 
changes in the strength of the individual leaders affected the CCP’s different applications 
of Communist ideology over time, which implicitly supports this thesis’s argument. 
Bridging domestic politics and ideology as factors in China’s foreign policy, Chen 
Jian examines China during the rule of Mao, and makes the argument that Mao as an 
individual leader mattered in shaping China’s decisions but also that his foreign policy 
decisions often had a domestic mobilization component.21 Chen also asserts that 
Communist ideology was an important explanation for the PRC’s foreign policy through 
1976.22  
Zhang Shuguang, Chen Jian, and Andrew Kennedy provide three important 
sources on analyzing China’s decisions to use military force from an individual leader 
perspective.23 Both Zhang and Kennedy argue that Mao’s experience as a military leader 
through the Chinese Civil War and the Long March gave him a strong sense of 
romanticism about using military force to solve national problems. The technological 
asymmetry of the conflict between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese 
Nationalists imbued in Mao the belief that manpower, rather than advanced weaponry, 
was the source of military strength. Chen argues that the PRC’s role in the Korean War 
was primarily a result of Mao’s martial tendencies combined with the CCP’s need to 
mobilize its support among the Chinese people after the Chinese Civil War. These books 
                                                 
20 Garver, China’s Quest, 18–26. 
21 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 
10–14. 
22 Ibid., 6–7. 
23 Shuguang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1995), 1–20; Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-
American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 5–25; Andrew Kennedy, The 
International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2–14. 
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focus mostly on Mao’s decision making during the Korean War. Closely related, 
Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu edited a volume of the individual perspectives 
of PLA generals and the debates among the PRC’s leadership before and during the 
Korean War.24 Li, Millett, and Yu’s compilation demonstrate the differing views on 
Chinese intervention in contrast to Mao’s predisposition to go to war.  
4. A Cooperative China 
He Kai summarizes China’s foreign policy decisions as a product of the 
international system and balancing against perceived threats.25 In a bipolar world, from 
1949–1991, the PRC first externally balanced with the Soviet Union against the United 
States and then reversed its balancing when it perceived the Soviet threat to be greater. 
While billed as a realist structural argument, the article still attributes much of Sino-
Soviet split and the U.S.-China rapprochement to Mao and his decision making.26 From 
1991–1999, He argues that the PRC saw a potentially multipolar world where China 
would be a pole, and both sought alliances to externally balance as well as building up its 
capability to internally balance.27 After the U.S. demonstrated its combat power in the 
Kosovo War, He asserts that China saw the world as unipolar, and began to internally 
balance more against U.S. capabilities. He makes no explicit predictions on whether 
China will be more aggressive towards the United States as it grows in strength, and 
suggests that China’s future attitude depends on the strategic interactions between the two 
countries. Absent U.S. strategic missteps, He’s theory more aligns with the cooperative 
family. He’s article presents the international structure changes as a potential alternative 
explanation for the differences in China’s use of force between the consensus period and 
the paramount leader period. However, given that multipolar systems are generally the 
                                                 
24 Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Yu Bin, eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2001), 1–12. 
25 He Kai, “Dynamic Balancing: China’s Balancing Strategies Towards the United States, 1949–
2005,” Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 58 (Dec 2008): 114–115. 
26 Ibid., 123–24. 
27 He defines internal balancing as increasing one’s own military capability to balance against a 
potential threat, and external balancing as seeking alliances or partnerships with other nations in response 
to a potential threat. 
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least stable systems,28 He’s argument suggests that 1991–1999 should have seen a China 
more fearful of uncertain threats and thus more aggressive. The evidence from MID data 
referenced earlier demonstrates otherwise, suggesting that just the changes in the 
international system (or the PRC’s perception of the international system) do not explain 
China’s changing behavior.  
Generally looking at China as a rational actor and its foreign policy as a product 
of international and domestic security concerns, M. Taylor Fravel argues that China is 
more likely to cooperate on territorial disputes when it is facing political instability or 
internal threats such as ethnic unrest.29 On the other hand, when China senses that its 
claim or bargaining power over a territorial dispute is weakening, it is more likely to 
escalate and use force. Fravel’s findings are that despite its increased economic and 
military strength, China has been less likely to use force in territorial disputes than power 
transition theory or offensive realism would predict. Fravel notes that the PRC’s claims 
over Taiwan is the most likely source of conflict and escalation.30 He asserts both that 
China’s behavior towards Taiwan should not serve as a general indicator of how it will 
behave in other territorial disputes, and conversely that China’s historical pattern of 
compromising and cooperating in non-Taiwan disputes should not be used to model its 
policy towards Taiwan.  
Alastair Iain Johnston did one of the first quantitative analyses of China’s use of 
force, using MID data up to 1992. Noting that most of China’s disputes have been 
territorial in nature, Johnston asserts that as China has settled most of its contested 
territorial claims, its frequency of use of force has decreased.31 Addressing realist 
concerns about the rise of China, Johnston argues that China’s increased economic and 
military capabilities have not led to a proportional increase in aggressive behavior 
                                                 
28 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 160–63. 
29 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 69. 
30 Ibid., 317–9. 
31 Alastair I. Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949–1992: A First Cut at 
the Data,” The China Quarterly, no. 153 (March 1998): 1–30. 
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because China’s gap between “desired and ascribed [international] status” has closed as it 
has gained a larger share of power in international organizations.32 
Allen Whiting, writing in 1975, also outlines that the main source of Chinese 
aggressiveness comes from territorial issues.33 Territorial conflicts aside, Whiting argues 
that despite a reputation for bellicose and extreme behavior, the PRC has actually 
demonstrated restraint, rationality and stability in its foreign policy decisions. Fravel and 
Johnston’s assessments are consistent with Whiting’s on both the importance of territory 
for China, and its willingness to cooperate or restrain its use of force, but Whiting’s 
analysis is limited by the time in which it was written. Johnston and Fravel have the 
benefit of writing in a later time with more variation in the PRC’s behavior and are better 
able to depict the patterns in its use of force. 
Andrew Scobell examines the international and domestic conditions surrounding 
several instances of China’s use of force spanning from 1949 through 2000. Specifically, 
he analyzes the interplay between PRC civilian leadership and PLA military leadership, 
and asserts that civilian leadership has generally been more predisposed to use force than 
military leadership in China.34 He also addresses Chinese defensive strategic culture as 
an influential factor on Chinese uses of force, and how that culture shapes the paradigm 
of Chinese leaders to consider any of China’s military actions as defensive, even if they 
are objectively considered aggressive by other nations.  
5. Economic Interdependence and China’s Peaceful Rise 
Bruce Russett and John O’Neal establish that economic interdependence (EI) has 
a statistically significant effect on reducing MIDs.35  They first point out that in any 
bilateral trade situation, the partner less dependent on the dyadic trade is less constrained 
                                                 
32 Johnston, “China’s MID Behaviour,,” 29. 
33 Allen Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 
3–15. 
34 Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
35 Bruce Russett and John O’Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 154. 
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in using force. Then they compare bilateral trade-to-GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 
ratios of the less trade-dependent partner to the frequency of MIDs between the two 
trading partners, and find that by increasing trade-to-GDP by one standard deviation 
(34.1%), the incidence of MIDs decreases by 44%. Russett and O’Neal also find a 
slightly weaker, but still important relationship between overall trade openness and 
reduced military assertiveness.36 
On the other hand, Keohane and Nye argue that asymmetric trade ties, i.e., 
economic dependence, can be used as a form of state-to-state coercion.37 This is 
illustrative for last several years of cross-strait relations, as Taiwan’s trade dependence on 
China has increased massively. Keohane and Nye’s theory predicts that China would use 
its economic wherewithal as leverage over Taiwan, possibly obviating the need for 
military force. 
In his most recent book, Christensen takes a more optimistic tone than his 
previous work on China’s uses of military force, and asserts that while historical 
examples of rising great powers predict bloody conflicts, China’s rise is different because 
of its EI with the United States and U.S. allies.38 Christensen notes that with the 
unparalleled increase of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and transnational production in 
the world economy, the nature of interdependence goes beyond the basic measure of 
trade-to-GDP that Russett and O’Neal use to measure EI.39 As Russett and O’Neal point 
out, FDI and transnational production tends to correlate with trade-to-GDP, so this thesis 
will retain that simpler measure of EI to measure the effect of interdependence on 
China’s aggressiveness. 
Thomas Moore and Yang Dixia argue that interdependence has influenced China 
in being more cooperative.40 Moore and Yang note that during the 1997 Asian Financial 
                                                 
36 Russett and O’Neal, Triangulating Peace, 143–46. 
37 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence revisited,” International 
Organization 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 728. 
38 Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2016), 37–62. 
39 Ibid., 42–43. 
40 Moore and Yang, “Empowered and Restrained,” 191–229. 
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Crisis, the PRC imposed economic and financial policies that were costly to itself (such 
as declining to devalue its currency despite the potential trade advantages) in order to aid 
the beleaguered region, especially Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. Not entirely 
convinced, however, they cite other examples of the PRC’s obstinacy in the international 
realm (e.g., mixed responses to arms proliferation agreements and refusal to abide by 
international law in South China Sea disputes) as proof that the effect of EI on China’s 
behavior is limited, and that China’s cooperative behavior represents “a country 
accommodating itself to the realities of international power rather than one that embraces 
the constraints of EI with palpable enthusiasm.”41 Moore and Yang’s assessment 
suggests that in issues of significant national interest and potential conflict, such as 
Taiwan, EI would not be enough to restrain PRC aggressiveness. 
6. Theories on Leaders and Decision Making 
There is a significant foundation of international relations theories analyzing the 
importance of individual leaders in national decision making.42 These are challenging 
arguments to make, as there is an implicit counterfactual in every assertion about the role 
of the individual leader. In other words, if one argues that Leader A lead to national 
decision B, then the converse is that if Leader A was not present, national decision B 
would not have happened. Structuralists would likely argue that national decision B 
would have happened regardless of who was in power, hence national decision B was a 
product of non-individual forces. As Jack Levy notes, herein lies the tension between 
contingent and determinist explanations.43 Determinist explanations generally mean that 
the international structure or domestic political dynamics are the cause of foreign policy 
decisions, whereas contingent causes mean that individual decisions were key in 
influencing policy. To use Levy’s language, this thesis will argue that China’s use of 
force during paramount leader period was more subject to contingent factors, while 
                                                 
41 Moore and Yang, “Empowered and Restrained,” 229. 
42 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 29–32; Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis, Why Leaders Fight (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 13–25. 
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military force decisions during the consensus period were more influenced by determinist 
causes. 
Robert Jervis identifies four levels of analysis to describe state behavior: 
individual decision making, domestic politics, domestic bureaucracy, and the 
international structure. Jervis argues that except in the most extreme examples, individual 
leaders and their threat perceptions matter in determining foreign policy.44 Specifically, 
within individual decision making, he focuses on the tension between perception and 
reality and how that shapes the decisions that nations’ leaders make.45 Jervis’ theory of 
perception and misperception is especially useful in analyzing PRC foreign policy 
behavior in the Cold War period since China’s central leaders had disproportionate roles 
in determining when and how to use military force. Understanding the perceptions of 
Mao Zedong will lend valuable insight into why China made certain foreign policy 
decisions during the paramount leader period. 
Elizabeth Saunders’s method of evaluating the role of leaders is to keep domestic 
institutions, great-power status, and the international system structure the same.46 
Saunders’s framework will be useful for evaluating Mao’s role between the Korean War 
and the 1954 Taiwan Strait Crisis, but unfortunately, all the non-individual conditions 
change between the paramount leader period and the consensus period, so this thesis will 
have to use a different method to determine causal factors.  
Jervis may provide a potential solution, who suggests comparing different leaders 
in similar circumstances and to compare the same or similar leader over time or across 
different contexts. Another method is to contrast differing viewpoints between leaders 
and their advisers; comparing Mao’s rhetoric with those of his advisers will be a useful 
framework for determining his role during the paramount leader period.47 Furthermore, 
the research question of this thesis implies that the perceptions and predispositions of 
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45 Ibid., 28–29. 
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Jiang Zemin in the consensus period were not more important factors than domestic or 
international pressures in shaping China’s decisions to use military force. 
Levy and William Thompson outline an institutional constraints model to explain 
why democracies go to war less than totalitarian states. Despite the PRC not being a 
democracy, the model may provide a potential explanation for fewer and lower uses of 
force in the consensus governance period.48  The model describes checks and balances 
and dispersion of power within democracies as a mechanism to restraining national 
decisions to use force. Levy writes that these changes “preclude political leaders from 
taking unilateral military action…and require leaders to secure a broad base of public 
support before adopting risky policies.” While not a democracy and not required to 
directly appeal to voters, the CCP has made political reforms to disperse power since 
1989, and the presidents of China from Jiang Zemin on have had to govern more as “first 
among equals” instead of “core leaders.”49  
Horowitz et al., study national leaders and their predispositions to use military 
force, and conclude is that the military experiences of national leaders matters in shaping 
their decision making on using military force. Specifically, leaders that have military 
combat experience are more likely to be cautious when using force, and those that have 
non-combat military experience more likely to be aggressive in their uses of force.50 
Horowitz et al.’s observations may yield important insight into China’s uses of force, as 
Mao Zedong had significant revolutionary and military experience, but Jiang Zemin and 
the leaders of the PRC since then have represented a “transition of Chinese political 
leadership from a generation of revolutionary politicians to a generation of technocratic 
politicians.”51 
                                                 
48 Levy and William Thompson, Causes of War (Malden, MA: Wiley and Blackwell, 2010), 33–37. 
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50 Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, Why Leaders Fight, 34–40. 
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7. Leaders and Decision Making in the PRC 
David Lampton continues the review of Chinese foreign policy after 1978 from a 
mostly domestic politics analysis.52 The book argues that four key modernizations have 
been shaping Chinese foreign policy changes post-Mao: globalization, 
professionalization, decentralization, and corporate pluralization.53 The main takeaway 
from the four modernizations is that more of China’s political elite is now involved in the 
decision making and policy making, and “the paramount leader has become less 
paramount and has been forced to consult more broadly.”54 Within Lampton’s edited 
volume, Lu Ning, Tai Ming Cheung, and Michael D. Swaine’s chapters are of particular 
importance. Lu examines the political reforms that have affected the central leadership 
structures since 1978; most importantly, the “gradual erosion of the preponderant role of 
the paramount leader in favor of the leading nuclear circle in the making of foreign policy 
decisions.”55 Tai Ming Cheung looks at the CMC, its shifting role vis-à-vis the central 
leadership organizations, and how Jiang Zemin (having come from a non-military 
background) managed his relationship with the military during his rule as the Chairman 
of the CMC.56 Tai’s piece argues that the CMC has professionalized and become more 
institutionalized in the era of reform, and has retained significant influence in China’s 
foreign policy decision making, especially with respect to Taiwan policy. The overall 
assessment of Lampton’s volume is that bureaucratic organizations and governmental 
roles have become more codified post-1978, which makes the PRC’s foreign policy more 
predictable and less subject to the whims of a paramount leader. 
Lu Ning also outlines the changes in the governance structures of the CCP in the 
consensus period.57 Lu addresses concerns about PLA “capturing” the foreign policy 
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decision-making process, and states that it has greater policy influence but is still 
subordinate to civilian CCP leadership. Overall, Lu argues that the institutionalization 
and pluralization of decision making in the PRC has led to less personalized, more 
predictable, and more stable foreign policy. 
Phillip Saunders and Andrew Scobell’s edited volume on the PLA’s role in 
China’s security policy decision making has similar findings to both Lampton and Lu’s 
work.58 Saunders and Scobell assert that the PLA has more clout in determining military 
issues in the consensus period, but far less influence in political issues. Saunders and 
Scobell conclude that the PLA is still very much under the control of the CCP. Increased 
PLA influence in the foreign policy decision-making process, combined with Scobell’s 
earlier findings of PRC civilian leaders being more prone than PLA military leaders to 
use force, suggests another related cause for fewer and lower uses of force in the 
consensus period. 
D. MAIN FINDINGS 
The MID data referenced in the beginning of the introduction show that China has 
been involved in fewer disputes in the consensus period (2.57/year) than the paramount 
leader period (3.63/year). As previously mentioned, when excluding MIDs that did not 
escalate above threats to use force, the consensus period only had 0.86 MIDs a year 
compared to 2.33 MIDs a year for the paramount leader period.  
This thesis analyzes two potential explanations for this pattern in China’s uses of 
force: economic interdependence and changes in domestic political structure. 
China’s EI with the world has increased dramatically in the same timeframe that 
its domestic political structures shifted from paramount leadership to consensus 
governance. The PRC went from an average of 7% trade-to-GDP in 1960–1976 to 39% 
in 1989–2015.59 As noted in the literature review, as a country’s EI increases, 
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aggressiveness and incidences of military conflict should decrease.60 The difference in 
China’s interdependence between the paramount leader and consensus period is 
convincing evidence that increased EI has decreased China’s military assertiveness. In 
addition, China’s behavior towards Taiwan in 1999–2002 compared to 1995–1996 
suggests an economic leverage dynamic also exists. China-US and China-Taiwan EI was 
not significantly different in these two periods, but Beijing’s behavior was more 
restrained in the later period. I argue that Taiwan’s increased trade dependence on China 
gave Beijing a sense of confidence that it could inflict economic pain on Taipei if needed, 
and that Taiwan’s reliance on the mainland meant that a declaration of independence was 
highly unlikely. 
My main finding is that, in addition to economic interdependence, the changes in 
the domestic political structures in the PRC has been a cause for its reduced uses of force 
over time. Lampton has outlined the changes as the PRC has shifted away from powerful 
individual leaders to a consensus-based governance process. Levy and Thompson’s work 
explain why this domestic decision-making structure change has had an effect on making 
China less aggressive: the consensus governance has placed checks and balances one 
person having overwhelming influence on national foreign policy. As the work on Mao’s 
role in China’s conflicts outlines, during the paramount leader period, the PRC’s foreign 
policy was extremely subject to his particular threat perceptions and political goals. 
These findings contribute to my argument that as China has transitioned from a strong 
paramount leader political structure to one of consensus-based governance, it has become 
significantly less likely to use military force, and when it does, it uses that force in a far 
more restrained fashion.  
E. CASE STUDIES 
This thesis uses multiple comparative case studies to analyze the patterns of 
China’s use of military force. The case studies will be the decision to join the Korean 
War in 1950, the TSCs of 1954 and 1958, the TSC of 1995–1996, and the period of 
cross-strait relations from 1999–2002 when Taiwanese Presidents Lee Teng-Hui and 
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Chen Shui-bian made overt attempts to establish international recognition for Taiwan and 
speeches proclaiming de facto independence.  
These case studies are chosen for three reasons. One, these case studies keep 
international variables constant, such as the potential for U.S. involvement and the 
geographic target of Chinese military force (except Korea). Two, the Taiwan issue was a 
major concern of territorial integrity and sovereignty for China in the paramount leader 
period, and the Taiwanese independence movement since the late 1980s has represented a 
significant threat to CCP legitimacy in the consensus period. China has consistently 
demonstrated that acute threats to reunification of Taiwan is a major national concern. 
Maintaining Taiwan in the case studies across the paramount leader and consensus 
periods ensures that the level of strategic interest to China is similar. Three, the time 
periods of the case studies allow for analysis on how China’s use of force has changed as 
its political governance structure has shifted from strong paramount leaders to consensus 
governing. While a different geographic area than Taiwan, the Korean War case study is 
selected because it remains the one conflict where U.S. and Chinese ground forces saw 
significant combat with each other. By comparing the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait 
Crises with the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and 1999–2002 period of Taiwan-China 
relations, the thesis will attempt to demonstrate that under similar conditions, the PRC 
acted in a much more constrained fashion in the consensus period than the paramount 
leader period. Considering the importance of Taiwan to China, measuring the PRC’s 
different responses to similar conditions in the strait will demonstrate that something 
other than the immediate threat is shaping the difference in reaction.  
For the paramount leader period, I establish that Mao’s perceptions and 
predispositions had significant influence in shaping China’s decisions to use military 
force. The indicators include contradictions between Mao and his advisers leading up to 
conflicts, Mao’s ability to sway opposition towards his viewpoints, and the political 
nature of the conflicts highlight Mao’s propensity to use military force as a policy option. 
Especially for the Korean War decision, I also highlight how his life experiences shaped 
his perceptions compared to those of his advisers, and how that likely made his role as 
the paramount leader pivotal in Chinese foreign policy decision making. In the consensus 
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period, I demonstrate that there were powerful voices within Beijing’s foreign policy 
decision-making bodies advocating for more aggressive responses towards Taiwan and 
the United States, but that consensus-based governing restrained China’s actions. I also 
highlight how China’s economic interdependence with the United States and later on, 
Taiwan’s trade dependence on China had a pacifying effect on Beijing’s decision 
making. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of the thesis is broken into two major sections. First it examines how 
the PRC decided to intervene in the Korean War. Then it will analyze why China initiated 
the 1954–1955 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises. Specifically, the chapter argues that Mao 
had an irreplaceable role in the decisions to join each conflict, especially the Korean War 
and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
Chapter III explores the PRC’s decision to conduct the missile and amphibious 
exercises that created the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–1996 as well as China’s response 
to other periods of Taiwanese separatism such as the statements that Lee Teng-hui made 
in 1999 and during Chen Shui-bian’s first presidency from 2000–2002.61 This chapter 
argues that the PRC’s response to Taiwanese separatist rhetoric and actions in 1995–1996 
and 1999–2002 were shaped by consensus governing restraining the policy preferences of 
hawkish elements within the CCP. In addition, the chapter argues that economic 
interdependence with the United States and Taiwan’s trade dependence on the mainland 
both served to reduce China’s likelihood to use military force. 
The conclusion briefly explores whether these dynamics hold up during Hu 
Jintao’s era and discusses Xi Jinping’s reign. Xi is consolidating personal political power 
to levels not seen since Mao, which suggests that China may become more assertive in its 
foreign policy. Understanding Xi’s policy preferences will be important for American 
policy makers and strategists, as his predispositions will play a bigger role than his three 
predecessors’ did. Some exploration into his theories on warfare and politics is probably 
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worthwhile for additional study. However, since EI remains high and Taiwan continues 
to be economically bound to the PRC, the potential effect of his consolidated power on 
China’s likelihood to use force may be tamped down by its deep trade ties with the 
United States and the world.  
 23 
II. MAO AS THE PARAMOUNT LEADER IN THE 1950S 
In the 1950s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) used military force as an 
element of its foreign policy in several instances, most prominently in Korea from 1950 
to 1953 and against the Kuomintang (KMT) in the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises 
(TSC). In all three cases, Beijing acted with significant military force against an entity 
supported or allied with the United States. Mao Zedong was also the paramount leader of 
the PRC during this period, with highly consolidated political power over national 
policy.62 For these reasons, the Korean War and two TSCs serve as good case studies for 
this thesis, which is examining whether the amount of power vested in the PRC’s top 
leader shapes when and how China uses military force. As an alternate factor, this thesis 
is also analyzing the effect of China’s economic interdependence (EI) on its military 
behavior. In the 1950s, China had very weak trade ties with the United States, South 
Korea, or Taiwan (really, anyone other than the Soviet Union) so it is not likely that EI 
played much of a role in Beijing’s decisions to intervene in the Korean War or initiate 
either of the 1950s TSCs. However, China’s EI with the United States and Taiwan was 
far greater in the 1990s and early 2000s (the second time period that this thesis is 
comparing) when another series of crises raised tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and 
Beijing’s responses were more muted than in the 1950s. With this in mind, it is salient to 
consider whether the change in EI affected Beijing’s actions in the two periods. Also 
important is that today, both Taiwan and Korea represent some of the region’s highest 
potential for conflict (while recognizing that the likelihood is still quite low).63 The 
Korean peninsula is still in an active state of war, although it is questionable whether how 
the PRC would respond if combat were to resume. The continued sovereignty dispute 
over Taiwan is one of China’s core interests, and even if conflict does not occur, it will 
persist as a driver of tensions between Beijing and Washington. 
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This chapter argues that Mao Zedong, the paramount leader of the PRC, played a 
pivotal role in determining China’s responses to the Korean War and the two 1950s 
Taiwan Strait Crises. First, the chapter briefly explores the thesis’s two independent 
variables in the 1950s: China’s EI and the PRC’s leader’s power and the domestic 
political structure within China. The next section analyzes the Beijing’s decision-making 
process leading to intervention in the Korean War in 1950 and demonstrates that Mao 
was absolutely critical in determining how the PRC responded to the war on the 
peninsula. The last section examines the two TSCs and concludes that Mao had a strong 
role (although less definitively than in Korea) in shaping China’s actions towards the 
KMT and its U.S. ally. For each case study, the section briefly discusses international and 
domestic events leading up to the war or crisis, highlighting the conditions that the PRC 
was responding to, before presenting analysis in how much the PRC’s actions were 
influenced by the paramount leader. 
A. ONE MAN RULE: CHINA’S CONSOLIDATED DOMESTIC POLITICAL 
STRUCTURE IN THE 1950S 
In this time period, Mao had the power to decisively guide national policy due to 
his immense prestige, political skill, and the structure of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
governance.64 Chen Jian notes, “by the late 1940s, Mao Zedong had established himself 
as the CCP’s indisputable leader. His comrades became increasingly accustomed to echo 
his judgment, rather than challenge his wisdom.”65 Most scholarship on Mao-era Chinese 
foreign policy depicts him as a dominant leader, especially in the 1950s before the 
political turmoil of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution unseated his 
absolute dominance. Zhao Quansheng describes China under Mao as a vertically 
authoritarian state, “where the paramount leader dominates through a vertical command 
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system.”66 By Zhao’s description, Mao enjoyed virtually unchecked policy making 
power, was generally able to impose his views on CCP leadership, and suppress 
dissenting opinions or political rivals. Tang Tsou provides a slightly different analysis, 
depicting Chinese politics under Mao as made up of informal factions of CCP elites. He 
notes, however, that Mao was at the top of these groups, and was exceptionally skilled at 
keeping the various blocs off-balance. By dividing and conquering, he was able to 
maintain his absolute power and promote his goals.67 Fredrick Teiwes observes that Mao 
was “the ultimate source of major new departures and the final arbiter of political 
conflict” within the CCP, had a fiery personality that intimidated and dominated his 
fellow leaders, and enjoyed prestige that “engendered considerable blind faith.”68 All 
these interpretations of early PRC politics vary slightly, but they align in showing the 
clout that Mao had in influencing national policy because of the political power that was 
consolidated at the paramount leader level.  
Furthermore, his policy preferences and threat perceptions were frequently in 
contravention with the rest of the CCP and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership 
when deciding how to respond to these three foreign policy crises. In the first decade of 
the PRC’s existence, its national interests were very much a product of Mao’s interests.69 
The Korean War is the strongest case, with the timing and scale of China’s intervention 
most clearly demonstrating Mao’s influence in contrast with his compatriots. Indicators 
of this influence include Mao’s beliefs in military force as a means to solve national 
problems (often called his military romanticism), his desire to intervene in the war 
despite other CCP leaders’ reluctance or hesitance, and most importantly, his ability to 
drive the decision to join the conflict in the face of opposition from other members of the 
Politburo.70  
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Beijing’s actions during the first TSC does not highlight Mao’s specific impact on 
its foreign policy as definitively as in the Korean War, since reunifying Taiwan and 
defeating the KMT was a common and agreed-upon position within most of the CCP 
leadership. However, the timing and political nature of the crisis is suggestive of Mao’s 
role in shaping the PRC’s decisions to shell KMT garrisons in the strait in 1954. In the 
second TSC in 1958, Mao’s influence in Beijing’s decision making is once again much 
more prominent. In each of the three incidents in this chapter, Mao prevailed in driving 
China’s foreign policy, his preferences being apparent in the details of China’s decision 
making and actions for each episode. Most importantly, in fitting with this thesis’s main 
question, he was able to do so because of the consolidated power and influence he 
wielded within China’s domestic politics. Considering Mao’s higher predisposition for 
military action compared to other CCP leaders, it is quite plausible that, had Mao not 
enjoyed as much policy-making power and had been required to seek consensus in 
driving national action, China’s responses to the three crises in the 1950s would have 
been more pacific. 
B. SELF-RELIANT AND ISOLATED: CHINA’S MINIMAL ECONOMIC 
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE 1950S 
Until after Mao’s death in 1976 and the beginning of economic reforms in 1979, 
China was mostly autarkic in its economic policy. However, it did seek trade ties in the 
1950s with the rest of the world for the purposes of money and investment to rebuild its 
war-torn country. Trade data from China during that period is largely unavailable, but 
some economists have indirectly calculated China’s trade from the archives of its trading 
partners.  
For this examination of the Korean War, the most important bilateral trade ties 
were China-US and China-South Korea. The PRC’s total trade in 1950, when it entered 
the Korean War, was approximately $1.2 billion. South Korean with the PRC was 
essentially non-existent for this year. Sino-Soviet trade accounted for $320 million or 
26% of that total, while Sino-American trade represented another 25% of China’s trade 
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that year.71 China’s total GDP, however, was roughly $71 billion in 1950, so the $1.2 
billion in trade was only about 1.6% of its GDP.72 This makes China’s 1950 trade with 
the United States and the USSR both around 0.4% of its GDP. While the numbers are 
small, they are not insignificant. The U.S. and Soviet Union were both important partners 
of China in 1950. According to one scholar, the United States was, in fact, China’s 
largest trading partner until December 1950.73 Considering that the Chinese decision to 
intervene in Korea was made in October 1950, this means that despite having some EI 
with Washington, Beijing was still willing to go to war in a massive fashion. Notably, by 
mid-1949, the PRC was already preparing for U.S.-led economic sanctions and began 
pivoting its trade strategy towards Communist governments.74 After December 1950, the 
U.S. economic embargo against the PRC took full force as a response to China’s entry 
into the war, which slashed bilateral trade to almost zero.75  
In 1954 and 1958, Sino-American trade was still minimal, as Washington’s 
economic embargo remained. China’s EI with the United States during the first and 
second TSC was essentially zero.76 However, it is relevant to briefly examine China’s 
trade with Japan and Western Europe. They had closely followed the U.S.’s lead in 
implementing a total embargo of China during the Korean War. Crippled by these 
sanctions, after the Korean War, China was desperately seeking to convince U.S. allies to 
break the embargo and re-establish trade ties.  
For the first TSC in 1954, the U.S.-led restrictions were still largely enforced by 
Western Europe and Japan, so EI would not have played an important role in that crisis. 
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However, the PRC’s desire to increase EI lends some insight into its decision making for 
the first TSC. Chinese diplomats used the 1954 Geneva Conference, right before the start 
of the strait crisis, as an opportunity to strike trade deals most of Western Europe.77 
China’s efforts to increase its EI with Western Europe then seems to contrast its sudden 
heightening of tensions by shelling KMT islands. This highlights the different policy 
preferences between Zhou Enlai and Mao: while Zhou and his diplomatic delegation 
were seeking trade ties with U.S. allies and trying to ease international tensions, Mao 
sought to use military force to highlight the Taiwan issue. 
 After the first TSC, Beijing appears to have specifically focused on inducing 
Great Britain to re-establish ties with the hopes that if the U.S.’s closest ally broke from 
the pack, the rest of the non-Communist world would follow. This strategy actually 
worked, with London actually lobbying Washington in 1956 to relax some of the trade 
restrictions. By 1957, Japan, UK, France, and West Germany had all reduced their China 
trade barriers to the same level as their Soviet trade barriers, a significant reduction from 
the U.S.-led total embargo against China. While China seems to have given up on 
establishing trade ties with the United States in the 1950s, it did seek economic relations 
with American allies and was able to do so successfully starting in 1954 despite U.S. 
guidance otherwise. The willingness of these allies, such as the U.K. and Japan, to 
deviate from the U.S.-led embargo in the mid-1950s might have actually emboldened the 
PRC leading up to the second TSC, having recognized that raising tensions with 
Washington or Taipei would not necessarily put trade with U.S. allies at risk.78 In other 
words, despite China’s objective of increasing its international trade ties, in 1958, it may 
not have been concerned that using military force in the Taiwan Strait would affect its 
economic relations. 
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C. THE KOREAN WAR 
The Korean War, waged between 1950 and 1953, remains the one instance of 
direct combat between the United States and the PRC. While the PRC did supply anti-
aircraft troops to North Vietnam that shot down U.S. planes during the Vietnam-
American War, the Korean War is the only example of U.S. and PRC ground forces 
exchanging fire and fighting over territory. The legacy of the conflict continues today, as 
the Korean Peninsula is technically still in a state of war. North Korea (Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) has become an international pariah, and South 
Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) an economic powerhouse. U.S. forces are still 
stationed in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korean aggression.  
The nature and timing of the intervention were products of Mao Zedong’s 
predispositions and immense power in shaping Beijing’s foreign policy decisions. 
Compared to his CCP compatriots, Mao exhibited a stronger affinity to using military 
force and fighting the United States. He had the means to implement his policy 
preferences because of his outsized influence and the structure of the PRC’s governance, 
as noted earlier. Since Mao had so much influence in determining national policy and 
action, his perceptions and decisions essentially became China’s perceptions and 
decisions.  
It is probable that China would have stepped into the Korean War at some point 
as the United Nations (UN) offensive drew closer to the Yalu River, regardless of 
whether Mao was in charge or not. However, this chapter will demonstrate the contrast in 
policy preferences between Mao and the rest of the CCP leadership, and that China 
ultimately acted in a manner that matched Mao’s preferences. This means that he was a 
key driver of why China intervened when it did and why it did so on such a massive 
scale. Mao’s role in China’s initial involvement in the Korean War supports this thesis’s 
argument that more consolidated leadership power in Beijing increases the likelihood that 
it uses military force. 
Before diving into analysis, this section briefly outlines key events and meetings 
in the United States, Soviet Union, DPRK, and PRC that led up to the war and the PRC 
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intervention. The core of this section argues that Mao was critical to shaping the PRC’s 
decision to join the Korean War. His ability to influence national policy was largely 
enabled by his supreme role as China’s national leader. The paramount nature of Mao’s 
position in turn allowed his perceptions about threats to China, his sense of optimism 
about the PLA’s capabilities against a technologically superior enemy, and his 
perspective on the use of military force to determine national action.  
1. The Path to War: January–October 1950 
Throughout 1949, Kim Il-Sung, the leader of North Korea, had been lobbying the 
Soviet Union’s leader, Joseph Stalin, to support a unification effort of the Korean 
peninsula. Stalin, wary of starting a global war with the United States, refused to support 
Kim’s requests. Stalin’s calculus changed in early 1950 when the U.S. secretary of state, 
Dean Acheson, made his famous National Press Club speech on January 12. Acheson 
proclaimed that the defense perimeter of the United States extended to Japan and the 
Philippines. A week prior, on January 5, President Harry Truman had declared that the 
United States would not intervene in the issue of Taiwan and China.79 Implicit in both 
announcements was Korea’s exclusion from U.S. defense considerations. Observing both 
these policy announcements and the U.S.’s prioritization of Western Europe, Stalin 
concluded that East Asia was more of an opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase its 
influence.80 The PRC similarly had serious doubts about U.S. resolve to aid South Korea 
in the event of a North Korean invasion, and also were likely emboldened by 
Washington’s January 1950 policy declarations.81 
Around February 2, Stalin began discussions with Kim the prospect of a military 
offensive to unify the Korean Peninsula. On April 10, Kim met with Stalin and received 
conditional approval to begin preparation, but was also warned that the Soviet Union 
would not intervene in the conflict and that Kim would need to secure support from 
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Mao.82 Since the end of the Chinese Civil War on October 1, 1949, the PRC had been 
repatriating to North Korea ethnically Korean troops that had served in the PLA, but 
otherwise, China had not been providing any support to the DPRK. After meeting with 
Stalin in April, Kim met with Mao in Beijing on May 13 to ask for China’s diplomatic 
and political support in the Korean War. At that time, Mao offered Chinese troops to 
Kim, who (arrogantly, according to Mao’s interpreter Shi Zhe) turned down the offer.83 
Through the rest of May and June, without much coordination with the PRC, Kim 
prepared his forces for the invasion of South Korea. Using blitzkrieg tactics, Korean 
People’s Army (KPA) rolled across the 38th parallel with 75,000 soldiers on June 25, 
1950, and began the Korean War. Immediately, the United States reacted and requested 
an emergency UN Security Council meeting. By June 27, the United States had deployed 
its 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait and was preparing its ground forces in Japan for 
movement to the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, ROK forces continued to be pushed 
south. Within three days of the invasion, the KPA had captured Seoul.  
The first U.S. forces arrived from Japan on July 3 and established a defensive 
perimeter around Pusan, with thousands of more troops on the way. Shocked by the rapid 
and unexpected U.S. response to the war, Mao and the rest of the CCP leadership shifted 
their focus from the invasion of Taiwan to the U.S. forces on the peninsula.84 With the 
U.S. fleet in the Taiwan Strait and American troops on the peninsula, the PRC postponed 
its planned summer operation to unify Taiwan under Communist rule.85 On July 7th, CCP 
leadership, at Mao’s order, formed the Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA) and 
began stationing PLA troops along the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and 
China.86 By mid-July, NEBDA had grown to approximately 260,000 troops.  
In August, U.S. air power began to inflict major losses on KPA logistics lines and 
DPRK infrastructure. The KPA advance bogged down as the U.S. and UN forces 
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continued to reinforce its defensive perimeter around Pusan. General Douglas 
MacArthur, the commander of the UN forces, executed a daring and successful 
amphibious landing at Inchon on September 15 (seen in Figure 1), which cut off the 
forward KPA units from their support lines and allowed the Pusan perimeter forces to 
break out and begin rolling back the North Korean advance. While the original UN 
mandate had been to counter North Korean aggression, in light of the stunning success of 
Inchon, the United States began discussing whether or not to continue on the attack and 
unify the peninsula under the UN command.87 
 
Figure 1.  The Korean War, Showing the U.N. Offensive into North Korea and 
the Subsequent PRC Intervention.88 
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By September 27, U.S. and ROK forces recaptured Seoul and continued to 
advance north to the 38th parallel. The same day, President Truman gave his approval to 
continue the offensive and “seek destruction of the North Korean armed forces.”89 On 
October 1, ROK forces crossed the 38th parallel and MacArthur demanded Kim Il-Sung’s 
surrender. In the meantime, the PRC had begun preparations to intervene in Korea but 
gave two final diplomatic warnings to the U.S.: on September 30 and October 2, PRC 
Premier Zhou Enlai proclaimed that the PRC would consider the U.S. crossing the 38th 
parallel as a threat to China, and would be forced to act if that happened. While 
MacArthur’s troops did not cross the 38th parallel until October 9, it was evident 
beforehand to the PRC that the U.S. would not heed the warnings, and issued its order on 
October 8 to form the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) and begin deployment into 
Korea. 260,000 Chinese troops crossed the Yalu starting October 19 and 20, and were 
actively engaged in combat with UN forces by mid-November. The speed and size of the 
CPV offensive took the UN forces by surprise, and before long, found themselves 
battling a hasty retreat to prevent envelopment. By December 6, the CPV had recaptured 
Pyongyang and forced MacArthur’s forces back across the 38th parallel. The war would 
continue on for over two more years before the DPRK, PRC, and UN command agreed to 
an armistice that ended hostilities near the 38th parallel where the war had started. The 
PRC’s intervention saved the North Korean regime from certain destruction and 
established the conditions on the peninsula that exist today.  
2. Mao’s Role in the Korean War 
Mao Zedong played an irreplaceable role in determining Beijing’s response to the 
Korean War. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, Mao had significant power to 
influence national policy, which made his perceptions and predispositions very important 
to shaping China’s actions. This section will demonstrate how Mao’s perceptions and 
policy preferences differed from his comrades in the CCP leadership, and how those 
differences manifested in the PRC’s actions on the Korean Peninsula. Mao had two main 
characteristics that set him apart from the rest of the CCP leadership: a stronger belief in 
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the PLA’s ability to prevail over technologically superior adversaries and a higher 
propensity to resort to military force as a policy preference. 
Mao’s beliefs on warfare, formed during the Chinese Civil War, favored mass 
infantry-centric strategy (People’s War) over technological combined-arms doctrine.90 
Because the PLA defeated the KMT on the mainland despite chronic materiel 
disadvantages, he was deeply convinced of the PLA’s ability to prevail over any better-
equipped adversary.91 In addition, Mao regularly demonstrated military action as his 
preferred tool for political goals. This worldview is evident both broadly in Mao’s 
political writings (famously, “political power grows from the barrel of a gun”) and 
specifically in his statements and letters leading up to China’s entry into the war.92 As the 
crisis on the peninsula loomed larger for Beijing, Mao was generally the first to 
decisively suggest military options while most of his CCP colleagues dithered on a 
military response to the war.  
a. An Eagerness for War 
Well before October 1950, when PLA forces actually began combat operations on 
the Korean Peninsula, Mao showed preference for an interventionist approach to the war. 
In contrast with almost all other CCP leaders, Mao consistently advocated for more 
aggressive action. Some of this eagerness stemmed from his Communist beliefs, where 
he sought a glorious victory against a Western imperialist power to demonstrate the 
strength of socialist ideology to both the Chinese people and the world.93 In addition to 
his ideological drive, Mao had a general propensity for military action as means to solve 
political problems.  
As early as August, when the North Korean advance began to slow down and take 
casualties from U.S. air operations, Mao showed signs of leaning towards intervention.94 
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In an August 4 Politburo meeting, Mao commented, “If the American imperialists are 
victorious, they will become dizzy with success, and then be in a position to threaten us. 
We have to help [North] Korea; we have to assist them. This can be in the form [of] a 
volunteer force, and be at a time of our choosing, but we must start to prepare.”95 Beyond 
Mao and Zhou Enlai, however, there was ambivalence and significant opposition towards 
intervention among the Politburo and PLA leadership.96 With few exceptions, this 
resistance to a peninsular operation remained through October, but Mao’s views 
ultimately won out. 
Robert Jervis provides an analogy that is helpful in measuring how much a 
national policy is driven by one person. Using the analogy of a house being on fire in the 
context of international relations, between different individuals there might be a debate 
on when the house is burning. In the case of German aggression in World War II, “For 
Churchill, the house was burning soon after Hitler took power in Germany; for 
Chamberlain, this was the case only after March 1939; and for others, there was never a 
fire at all.”97 By comparing rhetoric and statements of different decision-makers within a 
government during a time of crisis and indecision, we can estimate their individual 
propensities for assertive policies. In the case of Mao and Korea, the house was on fire in 
August 1950 when the North Koreans began losing ground against U.S. and ROK 
reinforcements, but many of the CCP leadership such as Marshal Lin Biao (a revered 
hero from the Chinese Civil War), Gao Gang (another influential PLA Marshal, NEBDA 
commander, and eventual logistics officer for the CPV) and Liu Shaoqi (third-in-charge 
in the Politburo) were still unsure in October 1950 as the United States neared crossing 
the 38th Parallel. Lin was Mao’s first pick to lead the CPV into Korea, but Lin turned it 
down, citing illness as the official cause. Many scholars suggest that, considering Lin’s 
opposition to intervention, the illness was probably a convenient excuse to turn down an 
assignment that he did not believe in.98 Marshal Peng Dehuai, the eventual commander 
                                                 
95 Shen Zhihua and Neil Silver, Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in 
the 1950s (New York: Routledge, 2012), 140. 
96 Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 83. 
97 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 20. 
98 Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 80–81. 
 36 
of the CPV, also demonstrated early ambivalence to military action in Korea. In August, 
when Mao was exhorting the creation of a volunteer force to help Kim Il-Sung, Peng 
tepidly mentioned that “the [Korean] problem is relatively complicated…this possibly 
creates a problem, and our country also ought to be prepared.”99  
Kim’s official request to Mao for military assistance arrived in Beijing on October 
1. As soon as Mao received the plea, he immediately began discussions for action: “On 
the evening of October 1, Mao convened a meeting with Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and 
PLA Chief of Staff Zhu De to consider China’s course of action. The meeting lasted late 
into the night. Consistent with the stance he had taken up to this point, Mao argued that 
the PRC should intervene. In this, he appears to have been supported by Zhou. Zhu, 
however, was ambivalent, and Liu was more or less opposed.”100 Even with prospect of 
the U.S. military occupying North Korea, Zhu was conflicted and Liu opposed 
intervention. This small top-level meeting does not appear to have agreed on a course of 
action vis-à-vis Korea. However, Mao wrote two telegrams immediately after the 
meeting that suggest that his mind was set and was going to order a PLA deployment 
regardless of Zhu or Liu’s opposition. Both were address to Stalin, but only one appears 
in Moscow’s archives, and the other only in Beijing’s archives. Most likely, one went to 
the Soviet Union, and the other was a draft that never left Beijing.101 Much analysis has 
been done on the language of both telegrams. Most scholarship on the Korean War 
published in the 1990s or before cite the version from Beijing’s records, which paint a 
clear decision to intervene in Korea along with some concerns about escalation of the 
conflict and the threat of U.S. air and sea bombardment on China’s coastal and border 
cities:102 
(1) We have decided to send a portion of our troops, under the name of 
[Chinese People’s] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades in 
fighting the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman 
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Rhee. We regarded the mission as necessary. If Korea were completely 
occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary forces were 
substantially destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, 
and such a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East 
(Emphasis added). 
(2) We realize that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea 
to fight the Americans, we must first be able to solve the problem, that is, 
that we are prepared to annihilate the invaders from the United States and 
from other countries, and to drive them out [of Korea]; second, since 
Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea (although we will use 
the name the Chinese Volunteers), we must be prepared for an American 
declaration of war on China. We must be prepared for the possible 
bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and 
industrial bases, and for attacks by American naval forces on China’s 
coastal areas (Emphasis added).103 
The telegram continues with confidence and decisiveness in action despite 
acknowledgement of American air superiority: 
(5) … The enemy would control the air while our air force, which has just 
started its training, will not be able to enter the war with some 300 planes 
until February 1951. Therefore, at present, we are not assured that our 
troops will be able to annihilate an entire U. S. army once and for all. But 
since we have decided to go into the war against the Americans, we should 
be prepared that, when the U.S. high command musters up one complete 
army to fight us in a campaign, we should be able to concentrate our 
forces four times greater than those of the enemy…so that we can 
guarantee a complete and thorough destruction of one enemy army 
(Emphasis added).104 
The above telegram, however, is not present in Soviet archives. The one in Soviet 
records depict a much less decisive CCP leadership and focuses exclusively on the 
difficulties of intervening in Korea: 
I received your telegram of 1 October 1950. We originally planned to 
move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to 
the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel. 
However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such 
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actions may entail extremely serious consequences. In the first place, it is 
very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our 
troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the 
success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can 
force us to retreat. In the second place, it is most likely that this will 
provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence 
of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question 
would thus become extremely large. Many comrades in the [Central 
Committee Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show 
caution here (Emphasis added).105 
Comparing the two telegrams lends a few insights. The draft telegram clearly 
demonstrates Mao’s belief in the PLA’s ability to prevail over U.S. forces. It also shows 
that Mao was concerned about U.S. air and sea power, yet still supported intervention. 
Lastly, the actual telegram sent to Moscow indicates that the rest of the CCP leadership 
was probably far less optimistic about intervention. As some scholars have suggested, 
Mao probably felt pressured to dispatch the less aggressive note to Stalin, both to foster 
consensus within the Politburo and also as a tactic to pressure Stalin into providing more 
materiel and air support for the CPV.106 
The next day, another Politburo meeting convened to discuss the intervention. 
Despite the opposition that Mao had faced the day before, he started the meeting with the 
statement that “the question now is not whether or not but how fast we should send troops 
to Korea.”107 He skipped any discussion about whether or not Beijing should act, and 
moved straight to how and when. At this point, Mao had already decided to intervene, 
and was working to convince his colleagues and ensure their support. 
At an expanded Politburo meeting on October 4, Mao asked the attendees to voice 
any concerns or disadvantages to intervening in Korea. The opposition to intervention in 
this meeting was fierce, listing domestic economic concerns, the recent ending of the 
Chinese Civil War, the need for consolidation of Communist control of China, and U.S. 
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military technological superiority.108 Peng Dehuai arrived late, having been summoned 
from Xian, and quietly observed the rest of the meeting that day. In his memoirs, Peng 
writes that he could not sleep that night and continued to dwell on the war situation in 
Korea. The following day, October 5, the meeting reconvened, where Peng declared his 
support for the intervention and asserted that “the tiger (the United States) wanted to eat 
human beings; when it would do so would depend on its appetite. No concession could 
stop it…we should dispatch troops to Korea.”109 While Chen Jian argues that Peng’s 
declaration of support was pivotal to changing the nature of the October 4–5 meetings, 
the meetings were likely for Mao to build internal political support for the decision he 
had already made.110 At the October 4–5 meeting, Peng was also appointed as the 
commander of the CPV and Gao Gang as the chief logistician for the CPV. Peng’s 
support for the intervention was unwavering after this point, but as some scholars 
observe, he spent an entire day in self-reflection and deliberation before declaring his 
support, likely due to his ambivalence towards the mission.111  
Mao established the CPV on October 8, issued its deployment orders, and 
announced to Kim that China would support North Korea. At the same time, Zhou Enlai 
and Lin Biao departed Beijing for the Soviet Union to meet with Stalin. The trip was an 
attempt to secure additional support from Stalin, especially air assets to defend China’s 
cities and the CPV advance into Korea. While meeting with Stalin, Zhou and Lin painted 
a pessimistic picture about China’s domestic economic and politic concerns as well as the 
challenges that the PLA would face against the technically superior U.S. forces.112 
Considering that Mao had already ordered the CPV to move into Korea, this pessimism 
was more likely a tactic that Zhou was using to obtain more support from the Soviet 
Union, especially air support. Zhou and Lin’s efforts were largely unsuccessful, however, 
and the CPV would deploy without any Soviet air cover. As noted earlier, the telegrams 
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to Stalin demonstrate that Mao considered U.S. air power a major concern. Despite the 
lack of Soviet aerial coverage, Mao pushed forward with the operation. The following 
section will cover this in more detail. 
Mao seems to have decided that Chinese entry into the Korean War was 
inevitable by August 1950, but was not entirely set on how or when until the first week of 
October, as the U.S. offensive approached the 38th Parallel and Kim requested Mao’s 
assistance. However, most of Mao’s compatriots were not on the same, considering that 
even in October, the majority were either against or on the fence about taking action on 
the peninsula. Despite this resistance, China deployed its forces as Mao directed. 
b. A Long Marcher’s View of the PLA 
 Mao’s experience as leader of the CCP fighting the KMT in the Civil War and 
Japan in World War II imbued him with a strong sense of martial efficacy towards the 
PLA and a romantic notion about using military force to solve national political 
problems.113 In this context, martial efficacy is the belief in one’s military ability to 
prevail, even when facing disadvantages in capability.114 Throughout the Civil War, the 
PLA’s ability to survive demonstrated to Mao the strength of humans over technological 
superiority.115 Furthermore, Mao believed in a deterministic notion of a weak power 
challenging a strong power and transitioning to become stronger through the conflict.116 
In his study of warfare, Mao found that “under certain conditions, the initially weak 
power often managed to survive the outbreak of war, gradually enhanced its strength, 
became relatively or even absolutely stronger than its adversary, and eventually won the 
war.”117 
This is not to say that Mao was the only CCP leader convinced of the efficacy of 
people’s war and the PLA. Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Lin Biao were all Long 
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Marchers and contributed significantly to CCP political and military thought.118 Having 
fought alongside Mao in the Civil War, they also understood the strengths of People’s 
War against better equipped adversaries. However, they all diverged from Mao in their 
eagerness to pit the PLA against a military as advanced as the United States.119 
Furthermore, as Zhang notes, “No single CCP leader had written as extensively on 
warfare as Mao did,” which likely strengthened his position as the premier strategist and 
policy decision-maker in the early PRC’s timeframe.120 
Kennedy’s analysis of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao provide some additional detail on 
the differences between Mao and his comrades: “This divergence between Mao and Liu 
does not seem surprising in light of their very different backgrounds. Unlike Mao, Liu 
only began to consider military issues seriously in 1937. Although he seems to have 
gained a healthy respect for the resilience of the CCP forces, Liu never approached 
Mao’s level of experience in military matters.”121 Unlike Liu, Lin Biao did have 
significant experience leading the PLA during the Civil War and might have had a similar 
perspective on mass infantry tactics beating better-equipped forces. Yet, he considered 
the PLA adventure into Korea to be a mistake. What is likely here is Lin’s international 
experience. From 1939 to 1942, he was in Moscow for medical treatments, and there had 
witnessed the capabilities of mechanized Western militaries firsthand during World War 
II: “Lin was therefore better positioned to see how much more advanced Western 
militaries were than the nationalists [KMT], and thus to appreciate the limits of what the 
PLA had accomplished in the civil war.”122 Mao’s exposure to combat up to that point, 
while robust, was exclusively the PLA fighting and prevailing over better-equipped 
militaries.123 This experience deeply informed Mao’s outlook on fighting the United 
States on the Korean peninsula. 
                                                 
118 Ibid., 27. 
119 Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 82–88. 
120 Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 27. 
121 Kennedy, International Ambitions, 64. 
122 Kennedy, International Ambitions, 85. 
123 Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 25–27. 
 42 
Notably, despite U.S. nuclear superiority, Beijing went to war with United States. 
Mao’s views toward nuclear weapons explains some of this brazenness. In August, Mao 
commented that even if the U.S. decided to use atomic weapons against China, “we 
cannot but allow them to use it because we do not have [the bomb] and thus we are in no 
position to stop them…we are not afraid [of the atomic bomb] and we just have to get 
prepared.”124 Later, in October, Mao called nuclear weapons “paper tigers.” 
In September, before MacArthur’s Inchon landing, the divisions in opinions about 
Korea were apparent in the CCP leadership. As noted earlier, by August, Mao had 
essentially decided on taking action on the peninsula. Chai Chengwen, the PRC’s 
political counsellor in Pyongyang, met with Lin Biao on September 7 to discuss 
intervention in Korea. During the meeting with Chai, Lin expressed “strong reservations 
about sending Chinese troops to Korea.”125 According to Chai, “at one point, Lin even 
asked [him] if the North Koreans had the determination to fight a guerrilla war if the 
situation reversed.”126 Mao, on the other hand, was much more optimistic about facing 
the United States in Korea. In a speech to the Central People’s Government Council on 
September 5, Mao asserted that the United States “was waging an unjust war of 
aggression and lacking people’s support.”127 He went on to challenge notions of U.S. 
military superiority by highlighting its extended responsibilities from Western Europe to 
East Asia, long supply lines, and low combat ability.128 In this speech, Mao once again 
addressed the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons and dismissed it as a non-concern. As the 
conflict developed, Mao continued to shape the decision-making process of the CCP 
leadership by dismissing U.S. strengths and emphasizing superior Chinese military 
morale as an equalizing factor.  
The Inchon landing and the subsequent rollback of the KPA in late September 
sped up Mao’s preparations for war. In a letter to Gao Gang (NEBDA commander) after 
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Inchon, Mao wrote, “Apparently, it won’t do for us not to intervene in the war. You must 
accelerate preparations.”129 Meanwhile, the UN forces continued to rolled the KPA back 
to the 38th parallel. Given the lack of coordination and communication between the PRC 
and the DPRK, it is likely that up until October 1, Mao and the PLA leadership were 
aware of the dire nature of the war, but not the degree of direness.130 That changed on 
October 1 when Kim Il-Sung officially requested PRC assistance. Kim’s plea forced the 
question of intervention for CCP leadership, but most Mao’s colleagues still expressed 
strong concerns with taking military action on the peninsula. Despite their hesitance, by 
October 8, Mao had signed his order to establish the CPV and deploy onto the peninsula 
en masse. 
As highlighted earlier in the telegrams to Stalin, Mao considered U.S. air and sea 
power an operational threat and recognized American superiority in those domains, yet 
he continued to advocate for intervention. Once again, his experiences in warfare 
informed his sense of martial efficacy and military romanticism. He was extremely 
confident in the tenets of mobile infantry-based land warfare, and did not consider air or 
sea power to be crucial for victory.131 Kennedy notes that “Mao’s martial confidence was 
focused on the prosecution of land warfare. Whereas Mao wrote prolifically about 
combat on land, he devoted virtually no attention to air or naval combat.”132 Similarly, 
Zhang writes that “although [Mao] was well aware of US/UN firepower and air 
superiority, the CCP chairman was not at all intimidated. Indeed, he even believed that 
the Chinese ground forces, if they maneuvered well, could wipe out the U.S. Eighth 
Army…in one fell swoop.”133 In his meeting with Peng on October 4, Mao said, ‘We 
have experienced decades of wars…didn’t we beat enemies with superior equipment in 
all of them?”134 Given the population-centric nature of the Chinese Civil War and the 
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costly and grueling but successful Long March, Mao’s military romanticism and 
confidence about the Korean War makes sense.  
Further highlighting Mao’s thoughts on air power was Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao’s 
mission to Moscow. They departed Beijing on October 8, the day that Mao signed the 
order to form the CPV. Zhou and Lin’s assignment was to lobby Stalin for air support for 
the Chinese operation on the peninsula. They were unable to secure immediate air 
support from the Soviets, however: Stalin told him that it would take two to three months 
to provide air support for the CPV. When he received the cable on October 12, Mao 
halted the movement of troops to the Yalu River and recalled Peng from the front to 
Beijing to discuss a way forward.135 Mao met with Peng and the rest of the Politburo on 
October 13, once again discussing the advantages and disadvantages of intervention. 
Despite the lack of air support, Mao’s optimism won out and the PRC leadership decided 
to press on with the plan.136 On October 17, Stalin once again backpedaled on air 
support, complicating the Chinese plans further: “[Stalin] stated that, even if the Soviet 
air force was sent out, it could only operate north of the Yalu River and would not enter 
Korea to cooperate in military operations with the Chinese volunteers…on 17 October, 
Mao sent urgent telegrams to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang to ask them to come to Beijing 
for consultation and to postpone the date of sending troops. As a result of the meeting on 
18 October, it was decided that troops would still be sent into Korea on 19 October.”137 
The fact that Mao issued stop orders and recalled Peng on October 12 and October 18 
after receiving Stalin’s telegrams demonstrates that, as mentioned before, he was 
cognizant and concerned with U.S. air power. However, his sense of martial efficacy with 
the PLA and overall military optimism won out over those concerns. Similar to his 
attitude towards nuclear weapons, Mao demonstrated concerns with U.S. air power, yet 
insisted that the CPV would be victorious regardless if they had Soviet air support or not.   
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China faced a far technologically superior adversary in Korea. The United States 
also had nuclear superiority and controlled the air. Stalin eventually provided significant 
air support, but for the initial foray, the CPV fought without any cover in the skies. Mao’s 
belief in people’s war and the ability of the PLA to succeed against more advanced forces 
explain the PRC’s decisive intervention despite facing such a well-equipped opponent. 
Almost all of Mao’s colleagues in the CCP were at least ambivalent if not clearly 
resistant to PLA operations in Korea. From political thinkers like Liu Shaoqi to seasoned 
military leaders like Zhu De and Lin Biao, the prospect of diving into war against the 
United States was extremely unpalatable. Mao, on the other hand, was undeterred in his 
beliefs about the PLA’s efficacy, even when facing the powerful United States. Against 
all the political inertia within the CCP, Mao prevailed in asserting his vision on the 
PRC’s policy and action towards the Korean War. 
D. THE 1954–1955 TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS 
In 1954, the PRC initiated a series of intense artillery shelling, maritime 
interdiction, and aerial raids on offshore islands held by the KMT. Most of the conflict 
was centered around Jinmen and Mazu, two heavily fortified KMT islands off the coast 
of Fujian province, as seen in Figure 2. Between both the KMT and PLA, over 1,000 
casualties were sustained.138 In early 1955, PLA forces conducted seizures of the 
Dachens and Yijiangshan, a group of smaller KMT-held islands further north near 
Shanghai. In the one-day battle over Yijiangshan, the two sides suffered over 900 killed 
and 1,500 wounded or captured. In February, the United States assisted the KMT in 
evacuating 32,000 troops and civilians from the Dachens, and the PLA occupied the 
islands afterwards.139 This incident was the first of three Taiwan Strait Crises (TSC) that 
raised tensions between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan. It accelerated the signing 
of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty that codified American support of the KMT 
and spurred American discussions about using nuclear weapons in the case of war in 
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Asia.140 The treaty, although since abrogated, remains in a lesser form in the Taiwan 
Relations Act, still informs relations between Washington, Taipei, and Beijing.  
 
Figure 2.  KMT-Held Offshore Islands Yijiang and Dachen (Near Zhejiang 
Province) and Mazu and Jinmen (Near Fujian Province).141 
During the first TSC, Mao was still very much the paramount leader within the 
CCP as during the Korean War. The CCP began to experience domestic political 
shakeups in the late 50s and 60s, some of which challenged Mao’s supremacy at times, 
but in 1954, he was the indisputable leader as noted in the beginning of this chapter.  
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This section does not argue that the first TSC was exclusively a product of Mao’s 
predispositions, certainly not to the extent that Korea was. Reunifying Taiwan and 
defeating the KMT were such high priorities for all of CCP that any leader would likely 
have resumed military operations to fulfill those objectives once the Korean War was 
over. Before Mao redirected the PLA to support Kim Il-Sung on the Korean peninsula, it 
had been waging fierce campaigns to seize offshore KMT holdings like Hainan Island. At 
the same time, it was defending the mainland from incursions by both KMT guerrillas 
and regulars.142 The Korean War and the U.S. deployment of the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan 
Strait put most of these operations on hold. After Korean War hostilities ended in 1953, 
Beijing was eager to return its attention to finishing its Civil War. Reunification of 
Taiwan with the mainland was and continues to be a core objective for the PRC. The 
unwavering strategic importance of Taiwan makes parsing out Mao’s role more 
challenging, since during his tenure, there was little evidence of dissension about 
Beijing’s cross-strait policies amongst CCP leadership.143  
However, it does appear that Mao’s influence was important specifically in the 
decision to shell Jinmen and Mazu as a political statement to a worsening cross-strait 
situation. The shelling of the KMT garrisons was intended to center international 
attention on U.S. meddling in China’s domestic affairs, signal Beijing’s disapproval of 
the pending U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, and mobilize the Chinese population 
around building a Communist society.144 The episode of “artillery diplomacy,” as Taylor 
Fravel calls it, bears many similarities to Mao’s well-documented predisposition to use of 
military force for political purposes.145 On the other hand, the assaults on Yijiangshan 
and Dachen islands had mostly military goals of securing the Chinese coastline and 
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continuing the campaign to defeat the KMT.146 With this military purpose in mind, CCP 
leadership would have likely have had a stronger consensus towards supporting the 
Yijiangshan and Dachen island operations. As such, compared to the Korean War, the 
first TSC is not as strong of a case of Mao’s perceptions or predispositions overriding his 
compatriots’ policy preferences. The first TSC, especially the small island seizures, arose 
in this context of the CCP wanting to defeat the KMT militarily, end the Civil War, and 
reunify Taiwan with the mainland. Mao’s role in the decision making for the first TSC 
appears mostly in the artillery bombardments of Jinmen and Mazu, and the evidence is 
much more inferential.  
This section first describes the key events that set the scene for the first TSC. It 
follows with an analysis of the evidence that suggests Mao’s influence in determining the 
PRC’s actions to the cross-strait situation in 1954–1955, specifically the artillery shelling 
of Jinmen and Mazu. 
1. Restarting the Civil War 
The Korean War armistice was signed in July 1953, bringing three years of 
bloody combat to an end. CCP leadership welcomed this easing of international tensions 
that would allow them to turn their attention back to ending the Civil War, consolidating 
control over China, and focus on socialist economic development.147 
The CCP wasted little time in restarting its campaign to reunify Taiwan. In 
December 1953, PLA general Chen Yi, commander of the East China Military Region, 
submitted a plan to Mao that involved a major military and infrastructure build-up in 
Fujian Province with the eventual intent of attacking Jinmen, the strongest of the KMT 
garrisons along the coast. Mao initially approved of this plan. Chen Yi established a joint 
headquarters for operations and throughout the first few months of 1954, made 
preparations for the campaign against Jinmen.148 Around May or June, Mao and other 
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military strategists in Beijing decided that focusing on the smaller islands across from 
Zhejiang Province (Dachen and Yijiangshan) would make more tactical sense, both 
because they were weaker garrisons and a more present threat to Shanghai, the PRC’s 
main industrial center.149 In this new plan, there was no mention of attacking Jinmen.150 
Both the Soviet Union and PRC started discussing the idea of peaceful co-
existence with the capitalist world around this time, as well, moderating their approaches 
to spreading Communism.151 China began earnest efforts to help settle post-colonial 
conflicts peacefully, most notably at the Geneva Conference in July 1954. Zhou Enlai 
played a major role in the negotiations that ended the First Indochina War and established 
Laos, Cambodia, and the two Vietnams.152 Most CCP leaders, including Mao, heralded 
China’s role in Geneva as a major diplomatic success that reduced the likelihood of 
another direct Sino-American confrontation and elevated the PRC’s image in 
international affairs as a broker for peace and responsible world power.153  
Meanwhile, the United States began discussions with Chiang Kai-shek, the leader 
of the KMT, on establishing a mutual defense treaty. Most meetings between Washington 
and KMT officials were secret, but Beijing caught wind of the deliberations in mid-
1954.154 The prospect of a treaty was extremely concerning for the CCP and Mao, as it 
represented foreign meddling in what they considered an internal affair, complicated the 
PRC’s plans of finishing the Civil War, and threatened to concretize the division of the 
country. Concurrent with the proposed US-Taiwan treaty, Washington was pursuing a 
regional alliance construct with several Asian and European states called the Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).155 The United States aspired to make SEATO a 
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Southeast Asian equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which to the CCP 
appeared as an attempt to contain China with a network of alliances. In addition, Beijing 
feared that Washington would incorporate its KMT treaty into the SEATO network, 
which would increase Chiang Kai-shek’s international support and legitimacy.156 
After the successful conclusion of the Geneva Conference, Mao sent Zhou Enlai a 
memo, dated July 23, that criticized China’s failure to bring attention to the Taiwan issue 
and exhorted further action:  
After the end of the Korean War, we failed to highlight the task [the 
liberation of Taiwan] to the people throughout the entire country in a 
timely manner (we were late by about six months). We failed to take 
necessary measures and make effective efforts in military affairs, on the 
diplomatic front, and also in our propaganda to serve this task. If we do 
not highlight this task now, and if we do not work for it [in the future], we 
are committing a serious political mistake.157 
Immediately, the CCP began a propaganda campaign titled “We Must Liberate 
Taiwan.” A revised campaign plan for the assault on the Dachen and Yijiangshan Islands 
also circulated PLA headquarters at the same time. Notably, the new plan included 
Fujian-based PLA shore batteries bombarding Jinmen.158 On September 3, the PLA 
began the first Taiwan Strait Crisis with several days of intense shelling of Jinmen and 
Mazu and continued its preparations to take the KMT-held offshore islands. 
2. Mao and the CCP Confront Taiwan and the U.S. 
Reinitiating hostilities against the KMT was not necessarily a decision specific or 
unique to Mao, as the CCP saw the operations mostly in the context of continuing the 
civil war that had been mostly paused during the Korean War.159 However, three 
characteristics of the September artillery exchanges establish Mao’s role in that decision. 
First, the timing and international context of attacks suggest that they were more political 
than military. As shown in Korea, Mao had well-documented inclinations to use military 
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force for political goals, which supports the likelihood that the bout of artillery diplomacy 
in the Taiwan Strait was also driven by Mao. Second, the CCP’s rhetoric and internal 
communications leading up to the attacks establish that Mao was key to the decision to 
shell Jinmen and Mazu.160 Lastly, while more inferential, Beijing demonstrated a very 
cautious approach to engaging the KMT when U.S. forces were around, and generally 
sought to avoid open confrontation with the Americans. This is likely an indicator of 
Mao’s evolution as a leader after the Korean War experience, after which he better 
understood the disadvantages that the PRC faced against the United States militarily. 
As noted previously, the PLA assaults on Yijiangshan and Dachen islands in early 
1955 were mostly military objectives to weaken KMT positions and reduce their ability 
to interdict shipping in and out of Shanghai.161 The two KMT garrisons on these islands 
were also the weakest out of all their offshore islands, and the PLA determined that going 
after the smallest posts would be most feasible while providing its nascent amphibious 
forces experience for eventual attacks on Mazu, Jinmen, and Taiwan itself.162 
Distinguishing the September shelling from the January and February island seizures is 
important as it contrasts the political nature of the former against the operational focus of 
the latter. 
The shelling of the larger islands had largely political objectives, and were part of 
a greater propaganda campaign to raise international and domestic awareness about the 
Taiwan issue. In July 1954, Beijing began heavily broadcasting the importance of 
“Liberating Taiwan” both domestically and to the international community. Primarily, the 
artillery campaign was intended to center international and domestic attention on what 
Beijing saw as foreign intervention in a civil war. Indeed, Ye Fei, the military 
commander assigned to execute the shelling seems to have grasped the political nature of 
his operation and its linkage with the “Liberate Taiwan” information campaign.163 
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Relatedly, the PRC was intent on demonstrating its claim over Taiwan and highlighting 
the cross-strait issue as distinct from the settlements of the Geneva Conference. The third 
impetus was to challenge Washington in its efforts to construct a regional security 
network to contain China and sign the defense treaty with Taiwan.164  
These political objectives are products of Mao’s perceptions and influence in the 
PRC’s foreign policy. It is possible that Beijing would have attacked Jinmen and Mazu at 
some point as a part of its military campaign to unify Taiwan, even if Mao had not been 
in charge. However, the PLA was in no position to invade Jinmen and Mazu when it 
initiated the barrages.165 It shelled the islands while preparing for operations on the much 
smaller northern garrisons at Yijiangshan and Dachen, but there is no indicator that PLA 
forces were poised to conduct landings on either Jinmen or Mazu at that time. Politburo 
plans reveal that the ultimate goal was an invasion of Taiwan, but that offensives against 
Jinmen, Mazu, or Taiwan would have to come much later after the PLA had built up 
more robust amphibious capabilities.166 This means that the artillery strikes, while 
deadly, probably did not have military goals. What seems more likely is that Mao 
suddenly became concerned about the Taiwan issue after the Geneva Conference and 
decided on military force as a solution. There is also some evidence that Mao sought to 
use heightened cross-strait tensions to mobilize the domestic population as a way of 
revitalizing the Communist revolution. On July 23, Mao sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai 
that highlights his thinking: 
The Central Committee recently discussed the situation related to the 
Geneva Conference, and it believes that after the agreements in Korea and 
Indochina, the United States is unwilling to accept its failure at the Geneva 
Conference, and will inevitably continue to carry out the policy of creating 
international tension…the United States will surely continue to use 
Taiwan to carry out pirate-style robberies of ships from various countries 
coming to our country… 
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In order to break up the collaboration between the United States and 
Chiang and to keep them from joining military and political forces, we 
must announce to our country and the world the slogan of the Liberation 
of Taiwan. It was improper of us not to raise the slogan in a timely manner 
after the cease-fire in Korea. If we were to continue dragging our heels 
now, we would be making a serious political mistake.167 
Right before this telegram and the start of the “Liberate Taiwan” campaign, China 
had just scored a public diplomacy victory at the Geneva Conference when Zhou Enlai 
helped successfully negotiate an end to the roiling conflict in Indochina.168 Why, then, 
would the PRC immediately stoke up regional tensions after such a diplomatic 
achievement? Just two weeks before, on July 7, the CCP Central Committee had sent 
Zhou another telegram boasting that “in Geneva, we grabbed the peace slogan…on the 
other hand, the Americans did not grab the peace slogan; they want to fight…looking at 
the general international situation, the U.S. is quite isolated.” He Di notes Beijing 
welcomed the period of regional calmness with the Korean War armistice and the Geneva 
Conference.169 Furthermore, while the July 23 telegram was extremely pessimistic about 
U.S. attitudes towards the outcome of the Geneva Conference, on July 19, Zhou Enlai 
wrote optimistically to Beijing that “We do not necessarily need to put any pressure on 
the conference since the United States made their position clear [that it would abide by 
any honorable settlement], Britain and France began showing a true spirit of 
conciliation…”170 The change in tone between Beijing’s memos on July 7 and 23, 
combined with Zhou’s note on July 19, indicates that something must have quickly 
changed the Central Committee’s policy direction vis-à-vis the KMT in those couple of 
weeks. There is little evidence to clarify what caused the change specifically, but what 
seems possible is Mao’s impulse to maintain the revolution: a combination of what 
Michael Sheng calls “Mao’s erratic policy behavior” and what Chen Jian asserts was 
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“Mao’s aspiration for creating new momentum for his continuous revolution.”171 A later 
paragraph of the July 23 telegram confirms the domestic mobilization objectives: 
The introduction of the task [highlighting the liberation of Taiwan] is not 
just for the purpose of undermining the American-Jiang plot to sign a 
military treaty; rather, and more importantly, by highlighting the task we 
mean to raise the political consciousness and political alertness of the 
people of the whole country; we mean to stir up our people’s revolutionary 
enthusiasm, thus promotion our nation’s socialist reconstruction.172 
It seems that the Mao suddenly became fearful that the Korean armistice and 
Geneva Conference’s solidification of two governments in both Korea and Vietnam 
might lead to a similar international agreement that permanently separated Taiwan from 
the mainland.173 Mao saw an opportunity to challenge this trend and he approached the 
problem with his propensity for using force for political objectives. With no known U.S. 
forces in vicinity, attacking Jinmen had low risk of escalation with the United States 
while drawing international attention to the situation and demonstrating China’s 
discontent with the situation while also mobilizing the Chinese people.  
Around the same time, the Central Committee promulgated a confidential 
instruction related to the “Liberate Taiwan” campaign that directed the military focus to 
KMT, not the United States. The memo continued on to say that the United States should 
not be the direct target and that challenges to Washington should be solely in the 
diplomatic sphere.174 The PRC’s cautiousness in engaging the United States militarily 
during the first TSC reflects some of changes in Mao’s perspective after the Korean War. 
While he typically exhorted Beijing’s Korea foray as a success, it seems that both he and 
his CCP compatriots learned that the PLA faced significant disadvantages against the 
U.S. military.175 In both 1950s TSCs, Mao demonstrated far greater restraint against U.S. 
forces compared to Korea, generally concurring with PLA recommendations to limit 
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operations when the risk of striking American vessels or troops was high. In some 
instances, Mao appears to have provided even stricter rules of engagement than the PLA 
commanders desired.176 PLA forces were given strict instructions to avoid targeting any 
U.S. vessels or aircraft, even in Chinese air space, unless they were under direct attack. 
An order from Beijing even forbade bombing the KMT forces on Dachen Island while 
U.S. ships were in the area.177 
Beijing’s increasing of political and military pressure against the KMT during the 
first TSC was not exclusively a product of Mao’s perceptions or policy preferences. All 
of China’s leaders considered unification of Taiwan a top priority and were extremely 
concerned about U.S. attempts to prevent those efforts. Most civilian and military 
leadership were eager to resume the campaign against the KMT after the conclusion of 
the Korean War. The capture of Yijiangshan and Dachen islands in early 1955 was a 
military operation as a part of that larger campaign, intended to erode KMT positions and 
make incremental steps towards an eventual invasion of Taiwan. However, the manner in 
which China used artillery diplomacy to address its political cross-strait concerns was 
distinctly characteristic of Mao’s influence. There is also some evidence that Mao sought 
to mobilize the Chinese people through the instigation of a cross-strait crisis. The shelling 
of Jinmen and Mazu in September 1954 was almost entirely political in nature. There are 
no indicators that the PLA planned to seize the islands after the bombardment, 
minimizing the likelihood that the shelling had a military objective. The timing of the 
attacks and domestic conversations in China highlights the more likely goal of using the 
barrages to make a political statement in the context of a worsening cross-strait and 
regional situation. The PRC was especially concerned with the proposition of a U.S.-
KMT defense treaty, the inclusion of the offshore islands in the treaty, U.S. efforts to 
build a regional security network that encircled China, and the risk that the diplomatic 
developments for Korea and Vietnam would lead to a similar outcome for Taiwan, 
permanently separating the islands from the mainland. China’s manner in dealing with 
these challenges were to use artillery diplomacy against KMT positions. Interestingly, 
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Mao and the rest of the CCP welcomed the easing of international tension that Zhou 
Enlai had achieved at the Geneva Conference in July 1954. Yet, immediately after the 
conference, Mao appeared to change his mind and criticized the Zhou’s failure to 
properly highlight Taiwan issue internationally. Around the same time, the CCP began its 
“Liberate Taiwan” propaganda campaign. Up to that point, the PLA’s military plans 
against the KMT had only included the smaller offshore islands, without any mention of 
bombarding Jinmen or Mazu. Suddenly, after July, the new plans included the larger 
islands. The sudden reintroduction of Jinmen and Mazu in the PLA’s plans, combined 
with Mao’s telegram and the propaganda campaign, demonstrates Mao’s influence in 
deciding to shell the islands and the political nature of those attacks. 
E. THE 1958 TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS 
On August 23, 1958, the Taiwan Strait again erupted in conflict when PLA 
artillery batteries unleashed barrages on Jinmen. The bombardment lasted two months, 
until October 25 when Beijing announced that it would reduce its shelling to every other 
day. During the conflict, known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, CCP and KMT 
aircraft and ships also exchanged fire with a few losses. Overall, both sides suffered 
almost 3,000 troops killed. The United States also clarified its stance vis-à-vis the PRC 
and Taiwan, declaring that it would use force to defend Jinmen, deploying six aircraft 
carriers to the vicinity, and escorting KMT resupply convoys to the embattled Jinmen 
garrison.178 During the second TSC, Washington also deliberately gave Beijing the 
impression that it was prepared to use nuclear weapons.179 Notably, this confirmed to 
Mao the wisdom in his plan (first proposed after the first TSC) to develop a nuclear 
weapons capability, which the PRC first tested in 1964.180 
Mao was more instrumental in driving the second TSC than he was in the first 
TSC. Mao’s statements highlight that the shelling was initiated for political reasons, 
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specifically in response to the U.S. and British intervention in Lebanon and as a 
mobilization tool for the Great Leap Forward.181 Once again, the use of military action 
for political purposes is indicative of Mao’s policy preferences. Actions and comments 
by Zhou Enlai around the time of the crisis, while not concretely contradictory to Mao, 
also hint at how he might have preferred to handle cross-strait relations and Sino-
American relations vis-à-vis Taiwan more peacefully than Mao. In the intermediary years 
between the first and second TSC, the PRC had made earnest efforts to reducing 
international tensions, increasing its trade ties with Japan and Western Europe, and 
reaching a peaceful settlement with the KMT. Zhou had been at the forefront of most of 
these efforts, suggesting his inclinations to diplomacy over military solutions to national 
problems.182 In this context, the sudden reversal in late 1958 to artillery diplomacy as a 
political strategy bears the traits of Mao’s propensity for military force. 
There is also evidence of a security-based explanation for the second TSC, that 
the PRC initiated the attacks as a response to a perceived worsening cross-strait situation 
with KMT military build-up on Jinmen and Mazu and increased U.S. assistance to 
Taiwan (including Matador tactical nuclear missiles).183 While these developments likely 
contributed to a general sense of concern about Taiwan within the CCP leading up to the 
second TSC, they were not the main factor in China’s decision to use force against the 
KMT in 1958. Most of the security-related events happened in 1957 and very early 1958, 
but the artillery strikes did not commence until the end of August 1958, after the Lebanon 
intervention and Mao’s decision to begin the Great Leap Forward. The timing of the 
crisis supports the political explanation more than the security explanation, and further 
suggests Mao’s influence in determining national action. 
As with the previous two case studies, this section first outlines the historical 
context and key events of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The second portion then 
analyzes the paramount leader’s role in deciding to initiate the conflict. 
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1. Resurgent Tensions across the Strait 
After the first TSC ended in early 1955, the CCP shifted away from using artillery 
diplomacy and tried achieving a peaceful settlement with the KMT. Zhou Enlai first 
announced Beijing’s willing to discuss the reduction of cross-strait tensions with the 
United States at the Bandung summit in Indonesia in April 1955.184 Through 1957, Zhou 
headed up the PRC’s diplomatic attempts to reunify Taiwan. In addition, he achieved 
significant success in prying U.S. allies away from the total economic embargo of China 
by established economic trade with Western Europe and Japan in 1956 and 1957.185 
Meanwhile, both the United States and KMT increased their military positions 
across the strait. In 1957, the U.S. deployed Matador tactical nuclear missiles, capable of 
striking mainland China, to Taiwan.186 Between 1954 and 1958, Chiang Kai-shek had 
also expanded his garrisons on Jinmen and Mazu from 40,000 to 100,000, which 
constituted about a third of his total available troops. Washington had also doubled 
American forces deployed to Taiwan to approximately 20,000.187 The United States also 
had begun the construction of an airport that could service its new B-52 bombers.188 
These developments both signified an increased threat to Beijing’s eventual goal of 
unifying Taiwan and an immediate security threat to the coastal mainland across the 
strait. 
The beginnings of the Sino-Soviet split began in the mid-1950s as well. Nikita 
Khrushchev succeeded Joseph Stalin as the leader of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death 
in 1953. While Mao had immense respect for Stalin, his opinion of Khrushchev soured 
within a few years of the latter’s tenure.189 1956 marked a turning point when 
Khrushchev delivered his de-Stalinization speech in February (notably, without having 
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invited a CCP delegation) and then sent Soviet troops into Hungary in October to quell 
anti-Moscow protests. Both deeply troubled Mao and led him to believe that the PRC was 
deserving of a more central role in world affairs than the Soviet Union and should lead 
the Communist revolutionary cause.190 Relatedly, because Mao felt less and less trusting 
of Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, he began to formulate ideas for China to be less 
economically dependent on its northern neighbor. Part of this new strategy was the Great 
Leap Forward industrialization and modernization initiative that Mao started in 1958. The 
second TSC served as a mobilizing and rallying tool for that program.191 
In July 1958, the United States and Great Britain sent military forces to Lebanon 
and Jordan to quell political and social tensions that were sweeping through the Middle 
East (specifically, a coup in Iraq). The coup was orchestrated by socialist and Arab 
nationalist military officers that overthrew the monarchy. Three days after the coup and 
interventions, he ordered the PLA to move aircraft to Fujian and prepare for artillery 
barrages against Jinmen, set to commence at the end of July.192 PLA preparations for the 
shelling commenced in earnest and reported on July 23 its readiness to begin shelling the 
KMT island positions. Mao then postponed the bombardment multiple times, seeming to 
hesitate on the execution of the plan.193  
Finally, on August 22, Mao issued the order to start the attacks, noting that the 
PLA should “take one step first, and look carefully before taking another step.”194 The 
next day, over 400 artillery pieces opened fire on Jinmen, raining more than 30,000 shells 
onto the island and killing 600 KMT troops and 2 American military advisers.195 The 
heavy barrage would continue for two more months, with KMT and PLA aircraft and 
ships also engaging in combat. In October, China reduced its pressure on Taiwan to light 
alternate day shellings of Jinmen, thereby ending the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. This 
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regular but less frequent pattern of artillery fire continued from 1958 until 1979, when the 
United States officially switched its diplomatic recognition of China to the PRC.196 
2. Mao’s Revolutionary Outburst 
Unlike in the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis, where some of the crisis was 
mostly a continuation of the Chinese Civil War and only partially a product of his 
specific influence, Mao was far more pivotal to the decision making in the 1958 Taiwan 
Strait Crisis. The second TSC was political in nature, highlighted by its connection to the 
U.S.-UK intervention in the Middle East and China’s commencement of the Great Leap 
Forward.197 The second TSC and Great Leap Forward should also be viewed in the 
context of nascent Sino-Soviet split and Mao’s desire to demonstrate China’s 
independence while lifting it out of the shadow of the Soviet Union. Some of his other 
remarks also suggest that by early 1958, he had gained a sense of frustration or 
impatience with diplomatic approaches to foreign policy, and specifically Zhou Enlai’s 
efforts to seek a peaceful solution to reunifying Taiwan.198 Chen Jian calls this “Mao’s 
postrevolutionary anxiety,” describing the attacks on Jinmen a “revolutionary 
outburst.”199 Juxtaposed with China’s approach to cross-strait relations in the 
intermediary years between the first and second Taiwan Strait Crises, the second TSC 
appeared as a sudden reversal in the PRC’s strategy. Combined with his remarks, this is 
indicative of Mao’s role in driving Beijing’s decisions in the second TSC, considering his 
propensity to use militarized conflict for political purposes. 
Starting in early 1958, Mao began to express his impatience with the PRC’s 
conciliatory approach to international affairs. In a March senior CCP leadership meeting 
in Chengdu, Mao pressured Zhou Enlai to self-criticize his role in China’s foreign policy 
after 1954, essentially accusing Zhou of making China’s foreign policy too pacifist, 
especially in dealing with capitalist countries. This was likely also a repudiation of the 
                                                 
196 Li, “PLA Attacks,” 167. 
197 Xiaobing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson, “Mao Zedong’s Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis 
of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents,” CWIHPB 6/7 (Winter 1995): 209. 
198 Chen, Mao’s China, 172–73. 
199 Ibid., 171–74. 
 61 
PRC’s more peaceful approach towards the KMT between the first and second TSCs, 
which Zhou had been a champion of. Soon after this meeting, Zhou resigned as the 
foreign minister. PLA Marshal Chen Yi took the post, immediately executing Mao’s 
orders to fix the diplomatic service. At the same meeting, Mao lamented that he had not 
commanded any military campaigns for some time, and that “this year, I will come back 
to do some military work.”200 The events at the Chengdu summit in March 1958 show 
Mao reasserting his authority over China’s policy making while simultaneously 
criticizing the PRC’s relatively quietest approach to foreign relations since 1955.201 His 
remarks about longing to command an operation also highlights the same romanticism 
about military affairs that shaped Mao’s decision making in Korea in 1950. 
The U.S. and British troop deployments to Lebanon and Jordan in July 1958 
deeply concerned Mao and stoked his revolutionist and anti-imperialist proclivities. Even 
before the British and American intervention, in November 1957, Mao had proclaimed 
that “U.S. imperialism is directing its spearhead of aggression and war toward Arab 
nations…This kind of aggression will lead to the danger of another world war.”202 Soon 
after the Americans and Brits landed in the Levant, Mao issued orders to the PLA to 
prepare aircraft and artillery in Fujian to bombard Jinmen. Mao argued that this operation 
would both show political solidarity with the Arab revolutionary movement while also 
drawing American resources away from the Middle East.203 He asserted that China 
needed to demonstrate its solidarity for the Arab people through both moral support as 
well as tangible actions. The PLA began organizing for the attacks, slated to begin at the 
end of July. Suddenly, the day before the barrages were set to start, Mao expressed 
hesitance to Defense Minister Peng Dehuai: 
[I] could not sleep [last night], but thought about it again. It seems more 
appropriate to hold our [plans] to attack Jinmen for several days. While 
holding our operations, [we will] observe the situational development 
there. We will not attack whether or not the other side relieves a garrison. 
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Until they launch a provocative attack, [we will] then respond with a 
counterattack. The solution of the problem in the Middle East takes 
time...To make a plan too quickly usually results in an unthoughtful 
consideration. I did such things quite often and sometimes had 
unavoidable miscalculations.204 
The PLA quickly halted the pending operation and waited for further instruction. 
Notably, when the order to initiate bombardment finally came in on August 20, PLA 
leadership had just lowered the Fujian forces’ readiness condition, returning them to a 
normal non-combat posture. Mao’s abruptness seems to have taken his military leaders 
by surprise.205 While the reasons for Mao’s sudden introspective moment of indecision 
are unclear, the letter demonstrates that Mao was in total control of the military’s actions 
and that China’s use of military force in this context was subject to his whims and 
feelings. 
By August 23, when the shelling of Jinmen actually started, the crisis in the 
Levant had subsided, but Mao seemed intent on sending a political message through 
military action. Two days after the shelling started, Mao confirmed the political link 
between the second TSC and the Lebanon situation at a CCP senior leadership meeting:  
The bombardment of Jinmen was an opportunity we seized when 
American armed forces landed in Lebanon [on 15 July 1958]. Our action 
therefore not only allowed us to test the Americans, but also to support the 
Arab people.206 
 Furthermore, with the military already prepared to shell Jinmen, Mao likely saw 
an opportunity to rally the Chinese people for the Great Leap Forward. He sought to 
energize Chinese industry to better compete with other world powers, even claiming that 
in 15 years, China’s industrial output would rival Britain’s.207 The Middle East tensions 
had galvanized millions of Chinese people to openly demonstrate against the “imperialist 
behavior” of the United States and Great Britain, and Mao sought to capitalize on that 
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fervor.208 Combined with his desire to jump start Chinese industrialization, generating a 
crisis on the strait was a convenient mobilizing event for Mao.209 
There is also evidence that Mao used the shelling of Jinmen to establish the 
PRC’s independence from the Soviet Union. In early August, Khrushchev visited China. 
Most accounts describe the trip as a tense episode between Beijing and Moscow, with 
Mao apparently even making efforts to personally embarrass Khrushchev by highlighting 
his athletic ineptitude.210 Mao did not once mention the plan to shell Jinmen during the 
four-day visit. In the context of the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet split and Mao’s 
growing sensitivity to Soviet chauvinism, what seems likely is that Mao did not want to 
give the Soviets the opportunity to influence his foreign policy while they were in 
Beijing.211 Mao also started the Great Leap Forward soon after the Khrushchev visit, 
supporting the idea that Mao wanted make China more independent from the Soviet 
Union. Attacking Jinmen served Mao’s desires to both mobilize the Chinese people and 
highlight his autonomy from Khrushchev. 
The U.S. and KMT military developments did also increase the PRC’s sense of 
threat and contributed to overall heightened cross-strait tensions leading up to the second 
TSC. Had they been the only catalysts for the crisis, it would be harder to argue that Mao 
had a key role in the decision to attack the KMT positions. They represented a fairly 
standard security concern, and it is possible that any other CCP leader would have 
reacted similarly. However, in late 1957, Mao dismissed any threats from United States, 
claiming that “the east wind is prevailing over the west wind” and calling American 
nuclear power a “paper tiger.”212 Furthermore, the timing of shelling does not support the 
strictly security-based explanation. In February 1958, the PLA proposed plans to field 
aircraft in Fujian and initiate an artillery blockade of Jinmen. Had Beijing acted then, 
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with the KMT and U.S. developments in Taiwan in late 1957 and early 1958, it would 
have seemed more like a response to a clear security threat, but the Jinmen shelling 
started much later and only after the American intervention in Lebanon and Chinese 
decision to begin the Great Leap Forward. 
The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis was driven almost entirely by Mao. After a few 
years of relative international and domestic stability, Mao seemed to have gained a sense 
of restlessness.213 He had complained about American imperialism in the Middle East in 
late 1957, and was also likely sensitive to the growing U.S. and KMT military 
developments in Taiwan (despite his bluster otherwise). He was also increasingly 
frustrated with the Khrushchev and was seeking ways to reduce China’s dependence on 
the Soviet Union. Having grown tired of Zhou Enlai’s peaceful approach to foreign 
policy after 1955, he first made efforts to undermine Zhou’s authority and power in early 
1958. Washington and London’s intervention in the Middle East in July triggered Mao’s 
decision to re-initiate artillery diplomacy against the KMT. After a month of hesitation, 
Mao gave the order for the PLA to commence its barrage of Jinmen. Notably, the Levant 
crisis had already subsided, but Mao confirmed in a CCP leadership meeting after the 
start of the shelling that the attacks on Jinmen were linked to the events in the Middle 
East. In addition, Mao’s behavior during Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing in August 
suggests that the second TSC was linked to the Sino-Soviet split and the Great Leap 
Forward. Mao’s rising frustration with Khruschev seems to have come to a head during 
this visit, and confirmed his already strong suspicions that China needed to distance itself 
from the Soviet Union. The second TSC served to both rally the Chinese people for the 
Great Leap Forward, which was intended to help China develop domestic industry and be 
less dependent on Moscow, and demonstrate Mao’s foreign policy independence from 
Khruschev. All of these causes for the second TSC highlight that Mao’s perceptions and 
preferences were instrumental in Beijing’s decision to bombard Jinmen in 1958. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
In the 1950s, Mao was unequivocally in charge of China’s policy-making process. 
Leading up to China’s entry into the Korean War, Mao displayed his predisposition to 
use military force and belief in the PLA’s ability to prevail over superior foes. Despite the 
reservations of most PLA and CCP leaders, Mao continually pressed for a massive 
intervention against the U.S.-led forces, and ultimately prevailed in determining Beijing’s 
response to the Korean peninsula situation. In 1954–1955, Mao was also key to shaping 
how China responded to a worsening cross-strait situation, albeit less so than he was in 
Korea. The first TSC was broadly in the context of the Chinese Civil War (especially the 
1955 island seizures) which the CCP and PLA leadership all agreed on continuing. The 
artillery bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu in September 1954, however, appears to have 
been a more political use of military force, designed to draw international attention to the 
Taiwan issue. Because the shelling occurred suddenly after China (and specifically Zhou 
Enlai) had made considerable efforts to reduce international tensions at the Geneva 
Conference, it suggests that Mao’s propensity to use military action was at play in the 
decision to initiate the conflict. Similarly, in 1958, Mao seems to have grown impatient at 
China’s diplomatic and economic foreign policy. He was increasingly disillusioned with 
Moscow, especially after its 1956 invasion of Hungary, and sought to distance China 
from the Soviet Union. The Great Leap Forward was part of how Mao planned to 
establish Beijing’s independence from Moscow, and the second TSC served to mobilize 
the Chinese people for the massive industrialization and modernization program. 
Furthermore, it allowed Mao to demonstrate his freedom of action from Khrushchev in 
setting China’s foreign policy. He also felt the need to make a political statement against 
U.S. imperialism in the Middle East, and linked the second TSC to the July 1958 
deployment of American troops to Lebanon. Notably, before each Taiwan Strait Crisis, 
Mao criticized Zhou Enlai for his handling of foreign policy. In 1954, it was Zhou’s 
failure to properly highlight the Taiwan issue in the Geneva Conference. In 1958, it was 
Zhou’s overall accommodating posture towards the KMT and capitalist countries. In the 
latter case, it resulted in Zhou’s resignation as the foreign minister. More inferentially, 
the restraint that the PLA demonstrated in the two TSCs also demonstrates Mao’s role in 
 66 
the conflicts. In each Taiwan Strait Crisis, PLA forces were extremely cautious against 
attacking U.S. forces, suggesting that Mao had gained a sense of respect for American 
military prowess after the bloody Korean War. He consistently directed the PLA to avoid 
or minimize attacks when the risk of striking Americans was present, often restricting 
their rules of engagement to the point of frustrating his military commanders.214 Overall, 
these three case studies demonstrate that China was fairly aggressive and militaristic in 
its foreign policy in the 1950s when its national decision-making processes was subject to 
the perceptions and preferences of one person. 
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III. CONSENSUS GOVERNING UNDER JIANG ZEMIN 
1990s and early 2000s ushered in a dynamic period for China, specifically for 
cross-strait relations. This chapter will examine two episodes from this time period, the 
1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis (TSC), also known as the Third TSC, and the period of 
tense cross-strait relations from 1999 to 2002 (when Jiang Zemin stepped down as the top 
leader of China). In 1989, Jiang Zemin became the General Secretary for the Chinese 
Community Party (CCP) and began taking over leadership of the PRC from Deng 
Xiaoping.215 Leading the country until September 2002, Jiang’s tenure was marked by 
definitively less consolidated political power than Mao. Starting with Deng and 
continuing with Jiang, the CCP made political reforms towards deeper institutionalization 
of governance and dispersion of political power. In contrast the 1950s case studies, where 
policy-making power was concentrated heavily in one person, in the 1990s and 2000s, 
the CCP governed much more by consensus amongst Party elites with Jiang serving as a 
first-among-equals.216 At the same time, China experienced massive sustained economic 
growth and became deeply integrated with world trade, especially the United States.217 
The two case studies that this chapter is analyzing, then, provide opportunities for 
comparison with the 1950s cases in the previous chapter. Both periods had one leader in 
charge for the entire time. Both feature Chinese military uses of force against the United 
States or a U.S.-supported entity. Apart from Korea, they all involve Taiwan, which has 
remained a key issue for the PRC. Two major differences between the time periods are 
the factors that this thesis is examining: political power concentration and economic 
interdependence (EI). In the Mao period, political power was highly concentrated in one 
leader and China’s EI was quite low. In the Jiang period, power was diluted amongst 
CCP elites, while EI was high and growing. Analyzing the difference between the 
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incidents of the Mao and Jiang periods may lend insight into whether changes in China’s 
EI and leadership power concentration affects its use of military force. 
This chapter argues that the overall shift to consensus-based governing in the CCP 
has led to a more peaceful foreign policy, especially in cross-strait relations, even when 
China was faced with threats to reunification. In addition, trade also appears to have a 
pacifying effect on the PRC’s approach to Taiwan. Specifically, China’s trade 
interdependence with the United States and Taiwan’s trade dependence on the PRC were 
important to CCP decision making in this time period. Similar to the Mao era chapter, I 
first lay out this thesis’s two independent variables during Jiang’s rule: China’s EI 
(overall, with Taiwan, and the United States) and its leader’s concentration of power. The 
following section examines the events of the Third TSC and demonstrates that Beijing’s 
decision to initiate coercive diplomacy was a consensus decision between hawkish PLA 
leaders, Jiang, and other moderates within the CCP. The last section looks at the period of 
Taiwanese independence-oriented rhetoric in 1999–2002. Unlike 1995–1996, China 
protested the statements but did not use military force. The PRC’s restrained response 
was due to many factors, including domestic politics and EI, which this section will be 
focusing on. After the third TSC, the United States seems to have taken the PRC’s 
concerns more seriously and was more proactive about voicing opposition to Taiwanese 
separatism.218 The hawks within the CCP also seem to have lost some favor because their 
coercive strategy in 1995–1996 did not work as well as planned. One main objective was 
to undermine political support for Lee Teng-hui leading up to the March 1996 
presidential election, but the tensions of the third TSC actually boosted Lee’s voter 
support.219 Importantly, Beijing did not resort to military force in 1999–2002 in part due 
to Jiang’s more secure political position, compared to during the Third TSC.220 The 
political legitimacy of China’s top leader in the eyes of the military seems to be 
important. While related to consensus governing and power concentration, the political 
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legitimacy of China’s leader is slightly out of the scope of this thesis. Additionally, it 
appears that CCP leadership did not resort to coercive diplomacy because they knew that 
Taipei’s actions would be constrained by Taiwan’s increased economic dependence on 
the PRC.221 Overall, Beijing’s relatively restrained responses to provocative rhetoric 
from Taiwan during Jiang Zemin’s tenure seems to have been a product of both 
consensus-based policy making and China’s increased EI. 
A. CONSENSUS GOVERNING: CHINA’S REFORMING DOMESTIC 
POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN THE 1990S AND 2000S 
In response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Tiananmen Square 
incident, the CCP began implementing significant leadership changes. The massive and 
spontaneous 1989 protests especially shook the party at its core, and ushered in a period 
of political self-reflection. The party began to transition away from Communist ideology 
and personalized, charismatic forms of leadership, and emphasize technocracy and 
economic growth. In this context, Jiang Zemin took over as the Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) and the General Secretary of the CCP in 1989. Jiang also 
was the first leader of China that had joined the CCP after the formation of the PRC, 
unlike Mao or Deng. He did not have the pedigree that his predecessors did as 
revolutionary fighters and founders of the PRC, and therefore did not enjoy the same 
level of prestige with other CCP elites or the PLA.222 As such, he took extraordinary 
efforts in the early years of his rule to engender himself with the military.223 Most 
accounts from this tumultuous period depict Jiang as a safe pick that would foster 
consensus and move Chinese politics away from leadership personality cult.224 This 
emphasis on consensus-based governance would have significant implications on many 
of China’s most important foreign policy issues in the 1990s, especially cross-strait 
relations. It should be noted, however, that while Jiang Zemin did not have the policy-
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making power as Mao or Deng, he still gave final approval to all foreign policy 
decisions.225 He also chaired the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG), 
Beijing’s most significant policy-making body for Taiwan policy, meaning that Jiang was 
almost certainly party to any PRC escalations towards Taiwan.226 
 As this leadership transition was happening, the CCP and PLA was becoming 
more divided into hardline (or hawkish) and moderate camps regarding Taiwan.227 
Reacting to Taiwan’s democratization and increase in domestic political support for 
independence, the hardliners felt that Beijing needed to apply more acute pressure to 
Taiwan before it strayed further. In this period, the hawks were generally represented by 
the PLA and their statements.228 A significant driver of the PLA’s hawkishness was the 
trauma of the Tiananmen Square massacre. The PLA had just turned its guns on its own 
people at Deng Xiaoping’s orders. After Tiananmen, military leaders realized the 
fallibility of CCP leadership, which led them to question their conciliatory approach to 
Taiwan.229 PLA leaders also felt that after Tiananmen, the military needed to reprove its 
worth to the country and doubled down on Chinese nationalism. Taking a tough stance 
and even possibly conducting operations against Taiwan appealed to many PLA officers 
as just such an opportunity.230 On the other hand, CCP moderates advocated for more 
strategic patience and gradual economic integration to promote eventual unification. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its head, Qian Qichen, was representative of the 
moderate approach to cross-strait relations, and its rhetoric and policy recommendations 
are used here as indicators of the moderates’ policy preferences. Notably, Qian was also 
the Vice Chairman of the TALSG, so he had considerable involvement in developing 
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Beijing’s Taiwan policy.231 These two factions became most evident during the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, but had also been in play in cross-strait events leading up to 
the crisis. Because of the distribution of power and divergence of policy opinions within 
Chinese leadership, this chapter will illustrate the differences between the factions by 
juxtaposing statements and policy proposals by the PLA and MFA with actual 
government policy decisions. As such, the chapter delves into considerable background 
events in order to illustrate the differences in preferences by the different factions within 
the CCP and determine exactly when policy changes were decided. The sharp contrast 
between the two factions means that there was a significant portion of PLA leadership 
during Jiang Zemin’s tenure that continually sought harsher actions towards Taiwan. 
Based on the mostly peaceful approach that Beijing adopted towards Taiwan during 
Jiang’s tenure, however, the hawkish faction only seems to have briefly been able realize 
their desired Taiwan policy in 1995–1996. Moderates were generally able to control 
China’s cross-strait policy from 1989 to 1995 and from 1996 on. By 1997, Jiang Zemin 
was more secure in his position as the PRC’s leader. He had earned better support from 
the military through deliberate efforts to build a healthy relationship by supporting 
military budget increases, quality of life improvements for PLA troops, and stay 
relatively hands-off from more mundane affairs.232 Most importantly, however, in 1997, 
the top two PLA generals, who were extremely powerful and hawkish towards Taiwan, 
retired.233 Jiang enjoyed a better and much more peer-like relationship with their 
successors, and thus was able to exert more control over Taiwan policy.234 This allowed 
him to keep a steadier hand on the CCP consensus vis-à-vis cross-strait relations, even 
when Taiwan exhibited more indicators of separatism in 1999–2002.  
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B. WORLD MERCHANT: CHINA’S GROWING ECONOMIC 
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE 1990S AND 2000S 
Starting with Deng Xiaoping’s rule in the 1980s, the PRC began reforms towards 
a more open and market-oriented economy. Growth picked up almost immediately and 
continued to accelerate throughout the 1990s. In the two decades under Deng and Jiang, 
the PRC averaged a whopping nine percent annual GDP growth.235 By the end of the 
century, the country was on the trajectory to overtake Germany as the third largest 
economy in the world, and soon after that, Japan as the second largest. China’s massive 
economic growth spurt was accompanied (and largely fueled by) an expansion of trade as 
seen in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  China’s Growing Trade to GDP Ratio in the 1990s and Early 
2000s.236 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the PRC’s economic interdependence with the 
rest of the world, and especially the United States, increased significantly. In 1989, when 
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Jiang took power, China’s trade-to-GDP ratio was 25%. In 1995, during the third TSC, EI 
had grown to 35%. In 2002, trade-to-GDP was 45%.237 Similarly, Figure 4 highlights the 
increase in China’s trade interdependence with the United States and Taiwan. China’s 
bilateral trade with the United States, as a percentage of GDP, went from 3.5% (1989) to 
5.5% (1995) to 6.6% (2002).238 China-Taiwan trade ties depict a very similar picture. In 
comparison, China’s trade was 1.6% of its GDP, and China’s trade with the United States 
was 0.4% of its GDP. 
 
Figure 4.  Bilateral Trade to GDP, China-U.S., China-Taiwan, and Taiwan-
China.239 
Considering the differences in EI and Beijing’s responses to threats to Taiwanese 
reunification between Jiang’s rule with Mao’s reign seems to strongly support the theory 
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that high EI reduces the likelihood of conflict. When a fairly isolated China was faced 
with a worsening cross-strait situation in the 1950s, it initiated artillery strikes and aerial 
operations resulting in hundreds of combat deaths on both sides. From 1992 to 1995, 
when managing deteriorating cross-strait relations once again while also being tied to 
increasing trade relations with the United States, Taiwan, and the rest of the world, the 
PRC decided to maintain a conciliatory position. In 1995–1996, when it finally decided 
to use military force, it limited its response to missile tests and military exercises as a 
form of coercive diplomacy. China’s increased EI with the United States and Taiwan 
seems to have affected both when it uses force, and after it decides to do so, how much 
force to employ.  
The dynamics of EI’s pacific effect on conflict outlined in most international 
relations theory, however, does not seem to explain the difference in China’s response to 
Taiwanese separatism in 1995 and 1999–2002. China’s EI with the United States, which 
was the most important bilateral trade relationship affecting the third TSC, did not 
increase appreciably between these two periods, yet Beijing’s behavior did. As Figure 4 
shows, China’s trade dependence on Taiwan or the United States did not change 
significantly between 1995–1996 and 1999–2002. Taiwan’s trade dependence on China, 
however, doubled between the two time periods. In this case, a different dynamic is at 
play: In the later period of Taiwanese separatism, CCP leaders recognized that Taiwan 
had become vastly more dependent on trade with the mainland, and knew they could 
pressure Taipei purely with economic and political measures.240 This is consistent with 
the recommendations of some of Beijing’s leadership, even before the third TSC, that the 
gradual economic binding of Taiwan through trade was a preferable reunification strategy 
to using military force. During the third TSC, too, there were calls within the CCP to 
isolate Lee Teng-hui politically and economically.241 While Beijing ultimately decided to 
use force in 1995, in 1999–2002, it chose not to knowing that it had economic power over 
Taiwan. Contrary to Russett and O’Neal’s EI theory and more aligned with Keohane and 
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Nye’s Power and Interdependence theory, China (the less trade dependent partner with 
Taiwan) seems less likely to use force not because of its own trade interdependence, but 
because of Taiwan’s dependence on China. Beijing knows that it can inflict enough 
economic pain so it feels confident enough not to use military force. So far, China has 
appeared content enough with just knowing that it has economic leverage over Taiwan 
without actually using it. In addition, because Taiwan is so dependent on the mainland, 
Beijing seems confident that a declaration of independence by Taipei is unlikely. 
C. THE 1995–1996 TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS 
From July 1995 to March 1996, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted 
multiple missile and amphibious landing exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan. The first 
series of tests were missile exercises in July and August 1995, as highlighted in Figure 5. 
The second round was a series of increasingly complex and prominent amphibious 
maneuvers in November 1995. The last and largest set was a combination of amphibious 
and missile exercises in March 1996. The United States responded to the March 
demonstrations by deploying two carrier battle groups around Taiwan, escalating tensions 
between Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. This episode between the PRC, Taiwan, and 
the United States is known as the third Taiwan Strait Crisis. One of the more escalatory 
post-Cold War military interactions between the PRC and the U.S., the third TSC remains 
an important period of Sino-American and cross-strait relations. 
This section argues that Beijing’s military actions were determined by a 
consensus decision between hawkish and moderate CCP leaders in response to growing 
signs that Taiwan was seeking independence and the perception that the United States 
was tacitly supporting those pro-independence leanings. EI (especially China-U.S trade) 
also factored into China’s decision making, specifically from 1992 to 1995 when the CCP 
debated how to manage worsening cross-strait relations.242 More inferentially, China’s 
deeper trade ties appears to have shaped China’s decision to limit its 1995–1996 actions 
to coercive diplomacy, despite its concerns about a U.S.-Taiwan plot to permanently split 
the island from the mainland. The reunification of Taiwan with the mainland has always 
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been a top priority for the CCP.243 Considering Beijing’s overarching objective of 
reunification, the conditions leading to the third TSC bears some similarities to the first 
and second TSCs in the 1950s. The big difference is that instead of shelling Jinmen and 
Mazu and actually exchanging casualties, the PRC restrained itself to shows of force.  
 
Figure 5.  PLA Exercise Sites during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.244 
First, this section will present the historical context for the third TSC, including 
relevant international events, policy changes by the PRC, United States, and Taiwan, and 
actions and statements by all three parties that shaped the confrontation. The main part of 
the section analyzes the PRC’s decision making starting around 1992, when the hawkish 
and moderate factions of the CCP are first noticeable, up through the third TSC. The 
period from 1992 to 1995 is illustrative of the domestic debates within the CCP vis-à-vis 
                                                 
243 Chen, “Comparing Jiang Zemin’s Impatience,” 960. 
244 Garver, Face Off, 75. 
 77 
cross-strait relations, as it features frequent attempts by hardliners to implement harsher 
policies against Taiwanese separatism, and the moderates’ ability to temper those 
recommendations until the onset of the crisis in mid-1995. Unlike Mao during the Korean 
War or the 1950s TSCs, there is scant evidence that Jiang Zemin sought more aggressive 
policies towards Taiwan than the rest of the CCP leadership. If anything, Jiang seems to 
have generally preferred a reconciliatory approach to cross-strait relations, but was 
pressured by PLA leadership to take a more assertive stance against Taiwan during the 
Third TSC.245 Jiang and the moderates seem to have made the decision to use coercive 
diplomacy both out of frustration that their approach was not working, in addition to 
acceding to political pressure from the hawkish factions.246 As the 1999–2002 section 
will explain in more detail, Beijing’s responses to Taiwanese provocations were far more 
muted and did not utilize military force at all.247 All of these dynamics  should be noted 
in the context that even when Jiang and the moderate factions felt the need to take a 
harsher position against Taiwan in 1995–1996, the shows of force in the consensus period 
were still far less aggressive than the shellings of Jinmen and Mazu during Mao’s reign. 
This seems to be in part due to Beijing’s civilian and military leadership determining 
policy via consensus.248 
1. Rising Tensions Across the Strait 
After the first and second TSCs in the 1950s, cross-strait relations remained 
mostly calm, although PLA and KMT batteries in Fujian and Jinmen continued regular 
artillery exchanges from 1958 until 1979.249 Starting with the 1972 Shanghai 
Communique, affirming that there is “one China and that Taiwan is a part of China,” the 
United States changed its official policy towards Taiwan.250 In 1979, the United States 
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severed official diplomatic ties with the Republic of China and established relations with 
the PRC. Concurrently, the United States abrogated its defense treaty with Taiwan, but 
shortly afterwards, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which obligated the 
United States to continue to provide military equipment to Taiwan. To assuage PRC 
concerns that the TRA constituted a continuation of the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty, 
Washington signed a joint communique with Beijing in 1982 that ensured that the United 
States does not “recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, only recognizes one China, and 
considers Taiwan a part of China.”251 This is known as the “one China” policy and has 
remained the official U.S. stance vis-à-vis Taiwan. Furthermore, in the 1982 
communique, Washington affirmed that it “would not seek a long-term weapons sales 
program to Taiwan, or exceed previous levels of arms sales.”252 The 1979 switch in 
diplomatic recognition, the TRA, and the 1982 communique ushered in a period of 
strategic ambiguity for the United States, in which it only officially recognizes the PRC, 
but continues to provide significant materiel support to Taiwan. 
Adding to the complexity of the issue, in the 1980s, Taiwan began to democratize. 
The KMT supporters who had fled mainland China began to develop a sense of their own 
identity over time. Taiwan’s industry had flourished, with economic growth rates of over 
8% between 1952 and 1982. This economic boom strengthened the Taiwanese national 
identity and expanded the island’s global importance. The economic growth and rise of a 
middle-class society contributed to increased calls for political representation under the 
KMT military dictatorship. As authoritarian rule relaxed, the Taiwanese native Chinese, 
who had lived on the island before the KMT occupation and had suffered repression 
under the KMT, formed an opposition party, called the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) that was based on Taiwanese independence from China. The DPP’s platform 
contrasted with the KMT stance of eventually reuniting China, and appealed to many 
                                                 




younger Taiwanese people.253 For Beijing, the prospect of Taiwanese independence 
threatened its long-term goal of reunification. 
As the 1980s ended, the Cold War came to a close, creating a challenging and 
dynamic environment for the PRC. By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had collapsed 
and United States became essentially an unchallenged superpower, having just 
demonstrated its military supremacy in the First Gulf War. Domestically, the CCP had 
also begun instituting political reforms intended to decentralize power and minimize any 
chance of Mao-esque personality cults.254 The PRC’s economic rise was in its early 
stages. In this context, Deng Xiaoping stepped down as China’s leader and handed the 
reins to Jiang Zemin. In cross-strait relations, the PRC formed the Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan created the Strait Exchange 
Forum (SEF) at the end of 1991. Both were semi-official organizations designed to 
facilitate dialogue between the two governments, and the development was seen as a 
breakthrough development in improving relations.255 
Despite Taiwan’s democratization, Beijing’s domestic challenges, and the 
dynamic geopolitical situation, at the end of 1991, cross-strait relations seemed to be 
steadily improving. The PRC seemed to feel more confident about eventual reunification. 
This would soon change, with the path to the third TSC confrontation starting in 1992 
when the United States approved a major weapons sale to Taiwan. 
2. The Consensus to Apply Pressure  
Beijing’s decision to use military force as a form of coercive diplomacy in the 
third TSC was made by consensus between hawkish and moderate elements within the 
CCP, responding to what they perceived as worsening conditions across the strait. The 
hawks had regularly advocated increased pressure towards Taiwan and the United States 
since 1992, when the Bush Administration decided to sell 150 F-16s to Taipei, and in 
1995, they finally got their way. There is no evidence, however, that hawkish PLA 
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leaders hijacked the decision-making process or overruled Jiang. What is more likely is 
starting in mid-1995, Jiang Zemin and the other moderates of the CCP also began to feel 
more pessimistic about cross-strait relations because of Taipei and Washington’s actions. 
They recognized that their conciliatory approach towards Taiwan did not seem to be 
working. Since the early 1990s, the moderates had faced accusations from the hawkish 
faction that they were encouraging Taiwanese separatism, and Lee’s actions in 1995 only 
invited further attacks from the hardliners. Developments across the strait led them to be 
more open to stronger approaches to Taiwan. In the face of mounting pressure from the 
hawks, the moderates concurred in advocating for demonstrative military force. 
The 1992 F-16 sale deeply concerned PLA leaders and other hardliners, as the 
acquisition significantly balanced Taipei’s air capabilities with that of Beijing’s and gave 
it a capable deterrent if hostilities were ever to arise in the strait, while signaling 
increased U.S. support for Taiwan.256 The PRC asserted the arms sale as a violation of 
the 1982 communique. However, its response was tepid and less assertive than the PLA 
would have liked, consisting of an official statement to the United States warning it of its 
“erroneous decision” that “seriously jeopardize” Sino-American relations.257 In the 
months following the F-16 sale, several PLA units submitted reports stating their 
readiness for war and proposing tougher actions against Taiwan and the United States, 
but nothing arose from these suggestions.258 Likely informed by PLA’s technological and 
materiel disadvantage to the United States, it did not advocate for open military action 
against Taiwan or the United States, but kept its recommendations to mostly coercive 
economic measures such as raising tariffs on U.S. goods or reducing purchases of 
American agricultural exports. Beijing did not enact any of these retaliatory economic 
policies, however, demonstrating how much it values maintain trade ties.259 Four senior 
PLA officials penned a memo arguing that “defending national sovereignty and 
independence should take precedence over all others and over transient economic 
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interests,” implying that the CCP leadership was subverting national interests to trade ties 
with the United States.260 Despite these complaints, the PRC continued developing cross-
strait dialogue through the ARATS-SEF channel, with the inaugural meeting of the 
chairmen of the two organizations occurring in Singapore in April 1993.261 
Lee Teng-Hui, the President of Taiwan, added to the provocations in 1993 and 
1994. First, he initiated efforts to obtain a seat for Taiwan in the United Nations General 
Assembly, separate from the PRC.262 In April 1994, Lee Teng-Hui openly claimed in an 
interview that Taiwan belonged to the “Taiwanese people” and even evoked the image of 
Moses leading the Jews out of Egypt, possible as an analogue of himself leading the 
“Taiwanese people” out from under the shadow of China.263 Both Lee and his Premier 
Lien Chan also took a series of trips through Southeast Asia to strengthen Taiwan’s 
economic ties with the region.264 This form of diplomacy by Taipei was quite limited in 
scope, but the endeavor stoked Chinese sensitivities about Taiwan’s drift away from the 
mainland. The PRC’s response to all of these actions, however, was once again mild. 
Beijing prevented the UN General Assembly from considering Taiwanese membership, 
and issued condemnations of Lee’s regional efforts through CCP propaganda 
publications. Nevertheless, Beijing kept its disapproval mostly at a pro forma level.265 
Internally, the hawks continued to seethe, lobbying the CCP to adopt stronger positions 
towards both the United States and Taiwan. They also began to attack Minister Qian and 
the MFA for misguiding Chinese foreign policy and encouraging Taiwanese separatism 
through weakness.266  
Starting late 1994, Jiang Zemin took a stronger role in shaping Beijing’s Taiwan 
policy. He began developing his “Eight Points” proposal and delivered the speech in 
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January 1995. The “Eight Points” reaffirmed Deng Xiaoping’s calls for “peaceful 
reunification” and “one country, two systems” while further offering conciliatory 
gestures, exhorting that “Chinese should not fight Chinese.” However, Jiang also warned 
against Taiwanese efforts towards independence and asserted that the PRC reserved the 
right to use force in reunification efforts (adding that force would be directed against 
foreign interventionists).267 Jiang’s speech represented a renewed attempt to reach across 
the strait, with the nuanced warnings likely intended to signal Taipei where Beijing’s line 
was. It also seems designed to assuage the hawks that Jiang and the moderates 
understood their concerns. In April, Lee Teng-hui responded to Jiang’s proposal with a 
reiteration of Taipei’s previous insistence that negotiations must begin with the 
acknowledgement of two separate governments.268 Beijing saw this as a flagrant 
rejection of Jiang’s extremely generous and conciliatory proposal. Lee’s response was 
deeply embarrassing for CCP moderates. To the hawks, Lee’s reply was a repudiation of 
Jiang and Qian’s efforts at peaceful reunification and demonstrated the fallacies of 
conciliatory approaches to Taiwan.269 
The final straw was when Lee received a visa in May 1995 to visit the United 
States and speak at his alma mater, Cornell. In April, the U.S. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher had assured the MFA Minister Qian Qichen that Lee would not get the visa. 
When the United States changed course and announced its issuance of Lee’s visa, Qian 
and the MFA (both already under fire for being ‘weak’ and encouraging Taiwanese 
splittism) were sorely embarrassed.270 In addition, in the last week of May, Taiwan 
initiated a series of military exercises geared towards counter-offensives against the 
mainland.271 Lastly, at Cornell, Lee made 13 mentions of “the Republic of China on 
Taiwan,” confirming to Beijing both his ambitions for independence, and Washington’s 
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implicit support of such a move.272 Hardliners increased their calls for retaliation against 
Taiwan, and appeared to get the upper hand in shaping policy.273 In mid-June, after Lee 
returned from his U.S. tour, the TALSG convened an emergency meeting. Normally 
convening with only one military member, this session had three in attendance, including 
the two most senior PLA generals. Jiang expressed his increasing concerns about the 
cross-strait situation. Confronted by “three irate military men insisting it was time for 
harsher action,” the rest of the TALSG concurred and decided to increase pressure on 
Taiwan, including military demonstrations.274 The MFA began exploring harsher 
diplomatic measures against both Taipei and Washington to signal Beijing’s 
discontent.275 In Qian Qichen’s memoirs, he affirms that most CCP leaders at this point 
believed that the United States was testing China on Taiwan, and that they agreed that a 
sharper, more acute response with limited military force was necessary to prevent the 
situation from worsening.276 The MFA recalled its U.S. ambassador and refused to 
accept Clinton’s newly appointed PRC ambassador. Several Sino-American dialogues 
were canceled. In addition, Beijing canceled an upcoming chairmen level ARATS-SEF 
meeting and issued a series of harsh diatribes against Lee (Garver notes, with a stridency 
not seen since 1979).277 Finally, after three years of equivocation on Taiwan’s 
separatism, the CCP’s consensus had shifted to a hardlined position.278  
After providing advance notice of its exercises, the PLA began the first phase of 
the third TSC on July 21, launching six unarmed ballistic missiles into international 
waters approximately 100 miles north of Taiwan. At the end of August, Beijing followed 
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up with six more missile tests.279 By deliberately choosing impact areas near Taiwan, the 
PRC was signaling its discontent towards Lee Teng-hui’s efforts to gain independence 
and continued U.S. support for Taiwanese separatism while exhibiting its capability to 
strike Taiwan if needed.280  
Despite the years of internal debate on pressure versus conciliation towards 
Taiwan, once the CCP had decided on stronger actions, it acted in unison. In a Hong 
Kong newspaper dated 12 August 1995, an “authoritative Beijing source” said that the 
PRC was already planning on conducting military exercises in March 1996, right before 
Taiwan’s first ever presidential election, to “spark economic and financial panic, as well 
as fear among the people in Taiwan” in the hopes that Lee Teng-hui would lose votes.281 
After the military demonstrations in July and August, Beijing and Washington 
held two high-level bilateral meetings, one between Presidents Clinton and Jiang in 
October and another between Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye and senior PLA 
leaders in November.282 In these meetings, the U.S. gave commitments to China that it 
would uphold the one China policy and would limit Taiwanese leaders from visiting the 
United States in the future.283 Sino-American relations improved. Regardless, the PRC 
continued its coercive diplomacy. In November 1995, Beijing initiated another round of 
military exercises as a signal to Taiwan. Held between the 15th and 25th, the PLA’s 
maneuvers coincided with the two week campaigning period before Taiwan’s legislative 
elections on December 2.284 The operation simulated the amphibious invasion of 
Dongshan Island in Fujian Province, directly across the strait from Taiwan. These 
demonstrations were, at the time, the largest and most complex that the PLA had ever 
attempted, with a never-before-seen joint service element that highlighted the integrated 
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capabilities of the PLA ground, air, and maritime components.285 The timing of the 
operations suggests the intended audience. As mentioned previously, in Taiwanese 
politics, the new pro-independence party DPP had emerged as a contender to the 
traditional KMT party. As the KMT pivoted towards a pro-independence platform, a 
portion of the KMT splintered off to form the New Party, a pro-reunification party. The 
DPP, KMT, and New Party were all contending for seats in the December 2 legislative 
elections, and the PRC timed the exercises to signal to Taiwanese voters its disapproval 
of the DPP and KMT’s separatism. On December 1, the day before the legislative 
elections, Beijing confirmed it would hold another round of even larger exercises in 
March, during the Taiwanese presidential election.  
The results of the legislative elections demonstrated the viability of China’s 
limited force strategy towards Taiwan. The most pro-independence DPP gained three 
seats for a total of 54 in the assembly, which were far less than previously anticipated 
considering the DPP’s gain of 30 seats in the 1992 elections. The KMT, also leaning pro-
independence under Lee Teng-Hui, lost five seats for a total of 85. The reunification-
oriented New Party gained 21 seats, a significant headway for the party’s first election. 
The November exercises had caused a 2.6% drop in Taiwan’s stock exchange and a rapid 
buy up of foreign currencies, and Taiwanese voters appeared to be repudiating the pro-
independence policies of the KMT and DPP.286 While China did not specifically state 
how it had intended the maneuvers to affect Taiwanese politics, the limited nature of its 
demonstrations allowed any kind of perceived difference in the legislative elections to be 
considered a success for Beijing’s coercive diplomacy. Its increased pressure on Taiwan 
was achieving the desired political effect. 
The final set of exercises occurred from March 8 to 25, 1996, and were the largest 
and most dangerous of the entire Taiwan Strait Crisis. The operations involved missile 
tests targeted much closer to the Taiwanese ports of Kaohsiung and Keelung, as well as 
larger joint-service live ammunition simulated amphibious invasions.287 The March 
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exercises coincided with campaign period for Taiwan’s presidential election on the 23rd, 
and were intended to signal its disapproval of Lee Teng-Hui and intimidate Taiwanese 
voters from supporting his separatism.288 At the same time, the CCP took steps to ensure 
that its limited force would not be misinterpreted. As the exercises were kicking off, 
China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liu Huaqiu, traveled to Washington to reassure 
the Clinton Administration did not intend to invade Taiwan.289 The PLA did not mobilize 
close to the amount of landing craft that would have been needed for an actual attack on 
Taiwan, nor did it utilize the level of air capabilities that an invasion would have 
necessitated.290 
The United States responded to these expanded exercises with the deployment of 
two carrier battle groups. Washington announced on March 7 that it was dispatching the 
USS Independence group to the vicinity of Taiwan. Four days later, the Pentagon 
announced the redeployment of the USS Nimitz battle group from the Persian Gulf. 
While cross-strait and Sino-American tensions had already been high since the summer 
of 1995, the carrier deployments represented a significant escalation. Washington’s 
response to the PLA demonstrations in 1995 had been exclusively diplomatic, so the 
Clinton Administration’s decision to move naval assets into the region constituted a 
major signal to Beijing. China responded to the U.S. deployment with accusations of 
interference in Chinese domestic affairs and supporting Taiwanese separatism, but also 
curtailed its missile launchings and amphibious maneuvers near the end of March.291 For 
the following three weeks, U.S. and PRC forces remained in a mildly tense stand-off. 
Two days after the Taiwanese polls concluded on March 23, China concluded its 
exercises as scheduled and stood down its forces. Lee Teng-Hui won the election over the 
DPP candidate Peng Ming-min. Beijing immediately reduced its rhetoric and actions after 
the election and the crisis subsided.  
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Beijing’s muscular approach to cross-strait relations had mixed results. China had 
made its diplomatic displeasure known to Taiwan. The DPP, the most pro-independence 
party, earned 21% of the vote, which was down from 33% in the December 1995 
legislative election.292 By appreciably affecting Taiwan’s politics and economics during 
the crisis, the PRC demonstrated control over its cross-strait neighbor.293 However, the 
coercive diplomacy did not deter Taiwanese voters from supporting Lee; to the contrary, 
his base seemed to strengthen amidst the tension of the crisis.294 The U.S. response 
demonstrated that Washington was still willing to involve itself in cross-strait relations, 
and that further calls by CCP hardliners for coercive measures might backfire on 
China.295 Domestically, the third TSC relieved the hardliners’ pressure on the moderates, 
and enabled Jiang to re-emphasize peaceful reunification.296 By ordering the military 
demonstrations and adopting a stronger position towards Taiwan, Jiang had addressed the 
hawks’ concerns about China appearing weak while maintaining a consensus within the 
CCP leadership. 
The CCP’s transition to consensus-based governing restrained the hawkish faction 
from driving China’s foreign policy from 1992 to 1995, despite Taiwan’s drift towards 
independence and perceived U.S. support. However, once the moderates within the CCP, 
especially Jiang Zemin, became convinced that their conciliatory and patient approach to 
reunification was not working, they acceded to the hawks’ recommendations to use 
military force as a demonstration of Beijing’s resolve. In addition, there is some evidence 
that Jiang and the moderates felt the need to maintain leadership consensus and assuage 
the hawks when their pressure for harsher actions reached a certain point, especially after 
moderate approach to cross-strait relations seemed to be encouraging further Taiwanese 
separatism. The CCP’s shift away from concentrated power in a paramount leader does 
seem to have reduced China’s likelihood to use military force when comparing the third 
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TSC with the first and second. However, considering that Jiang’s decision to initiate 
coercive diplomacy in 1995 and 1996 was in part because of hawkish pressures within 
the CCP, it appears that because the PRC leader was in a less secure political position, 
consensus-based governing also enabled militarized actions in response to a worsening 
cross-strait situation. It should also be noted that even when Beijing did decide to use 
military force in 1995–1996, the actions were restrained. China was careful to clarify that 
its exercises were not a lead-up to an actual military conflict. This measured military 
response to the worsening cross-strait situation is at least in part due to the PRC’s desires 
to maintain strong economic relations with the United States and the rest of the world. In 
other words, consensus governing caused China to be more conciliatory from 1992–1995 
despite Taiwanese and U.S. challenges to reunification; when Beijing finally decided to 
use more coercive actions, EI played a role in how it applied pressure. 
D. AVOIDED CONFLICTS IN 1999 AND 2002 
1. Fluctuating Cross-Strait Relations 
Between 1996 and 1999, cross-strait and Sino-American relations remained stable 
with some improvement. Beijing and Taipei made overtures to restart cross-strait 
exchanges through the ARATS-SEF channel. Initially, the PRC required agreement to the 
“one China” principle, but then by the end of 1997, MFA Minister Qian Qichen had 
dropped the requirement as a precondition for reinitiating dialogue. In 1998, President 
Clinton traveled to China, where he made the “three Nos” speech, affirming that the 
United States did not support Taiwanese independence, a two China solution, or 
Taiwan’s admission to any international organizations.297 By the end of 1998, China and 
Taiwan had officially agreed to the resumption of ARATS-SEF dialogues, and the two 
chairmen of their respective organizations met in October 1998, their first since the 
inaugural 1993 summit in Singapore.298 
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Lee Teng-hui threw a wrench into the budding cross-strait communications in 
July 1999. Publicly, he described the cross-strait relationship as a “special state-to-state” 
one. Beijing immediately cancelled the upcoming ARATS-SEF meeting, planned for fall 
1999 in Taipei, and issued a series of official condemnations of Taiwan’s behavior, 
including hints at using military force. The PRC and U.S. began exchanging heated 
rhetoric over the growing cross-strait tensions.299 At the same time, Sino-American 
relations were souring for other reasons. NATO had just concluded its U.S.-led air 
campaign in Kosovo, which the PRC considered an international intervention in a 
domestic affair and stoked China’s sensitivities about external violations of its own 
sovereignty. Making matters worse, during the operation, the United States bombed the 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists.300 Regardless of all these 
sources of friction, however, Beijing kept its response mild. Its statements were harsh, 
but there does not seem to have been any discussion of military action. 
Taiwan had its second presidential election in March 2000, with Chen Shui-bian 
running for the DPP, the unabashedly pro-independence party. Leading up to the vote, 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji strenuously warned Taiwanese voters to “make the right 
historical choice,” and that if not, they “won’t get another opportunity to regret.” A 
month prior, Zhu had obliquely threatened military force against Taiwan if it continued to 
prolong reunification talks.301 Beijing also released a white paper around the same time 
that suggested impatience with Taiwan’s delay and China’s willingness to increase 
pressure for reunification.302 While Chen was soft spoken on Taiwanese independence 
for most of his campaign, three days before the election, he proclaimed at a rally that 
“Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country” and that Taiwan would never reunify 
under “one country, two systems.”303 Chen’s victory was a further cause for concern for 
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the mainland. It was the first election of a non-KMT president, and an indicator of the 
Taiwanese population’s increasing sense of self-identity. Once again, despite these 
heightened tensions and concerns, the PRC remained relatively restrained in its response. 
Most importantly, unlike the 1996 election, it refrained from any kind of military signals 
to Taiwanese voters. 
In 2002, Chen Shui-bian threatened to catalyze another crisis in cross-strait 
relations. In August, Chen proclaimed in a speech that Taiwan and China were two 
countries on each side of the strait, Taiwan did not belong to any other country and that it 
had always been an independent entity. China, like in 1999, responded with vehement 
objections to this new exhibition of Taiwanese separatism. Sino-American relations had 
also suffered a low point the year before, after the EP-3 collision and the subsequent 
detention of the American aircrew. However, apart from terse statements like in 1999 and 
2000, the PRC did not resort to military actions to increase pressure on Taiwan. 
1. Beijing’s Steady Hand 
The PRC’s relatively calm responses to Taiwanese separatism from 1999–2002 
stand in contrast with its coercive diplomacy in 1995–1996. Because tensions remained 
fairly low, data on this period of cross-strait relations is sparse compared to that of the 
third TSC. However, the research that is available points to several factors that shaped 
China’s actions. One cause is Washington’s alacrity in disavowing support for Taiwanese 
independence and its harsh criticism of Lee and Chen’s comments.304 Another factor is 
China’s far stronger economic and military position and growth in 1999–2002 compared 
to 1995. By 1999, China had increased its GDP by about 25% from where it was in 
1995.305 China’s economic interdependence (EI) also appears to have affected China’s 
decision making, but not in the manner that the EI theory predicts. China’s trade-to-GDP 
with the world had increased from around 35% to 40%, but its trade with the United 
States and Taiwan had not changed appreciably between 1995 and 1999 or 2002. More 
telling is Taiwan’s trade dependence on China. Between 1995 and 1999, Taiwan’s trade-
                                                 
304 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 262–65. 
305 World Bank, “GDP (current US$), China.” 
 91 
to-GDP ratio with China went from 6% to 8%. In 2002, it was almost 15%.306 The CCP 
seems to have recognized that Taiwan was becoming increasingly tied to the mainland 
through deepening economic ties, and that Beijing could apply pressure through non-
military means if needed. Notably, China did not use economic retaliation, but was 
content merely having the ability to exact economic pain on Taiwan. Furthermore, 
Taiwan’s economic dependence on China was an indicator to CCP leadership that 
eventual reunification was more likely, or at the very least, outright independence was 
very unlikely.307 The last factors were Jiang Zemin’s political position and the CCP 
consensus on cross-strait relations. By 1999, Jiang had developed a better relationship 
with the PLA, especially its top leadership. Notably, two of the most powerful generals 
that had been the strongest advocates for increased military pressure against Taiwan 
during the third TSC retired in 1997. With their successors, who were much more of 
peers to Jiang, the PRC leader was better able to control policy and maintain a steady 
hand on the helm.308 Furthermore, in this later period of cross-strait relations, CCP elites 
seem to have come to a consensus that economic and political approaches to reunification 
were preferable to military options.309 This is likely both because of Jiang’s more secure 
political position as well as Chinese leadership reflections on its coercive diplomacy 
during the third TSC, recognizing that its militarized actions to undermine political 
support for Lee Teng-hui backfired. Also, some scholars have observed that the CCP 
underwent generational shift around the turn of the decade in both top leaders and foreign 
policy advisers to the MFA and PLA. The new cohort of leaders and advisers exhibited 
more open-mindedness and worldliness, and specifically deeper understandings of 
democratic systems and societies.310 This paradigm change likely informed Beijing how 
better to manage relations with its democratic cross-strait neighbor. 
                                                 
306 World Bank, “GDP (current US$), China”; IMF, “Direction of Trade Statistics.”; Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation, “Key Indicators Database, Chinese Taipei.” 
307 Qian Qimao, “China’s New Approaches to a Peaceful Solution of the Taiwan Issue,” American 
Foreign Policy Interests 25 (2003): 515–16; Chen-Yuan Tung, “An Assessment of China’s Taiwan Policy 
under the Third Generation Leadership,” Asian Survey 45, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 353–55. 
308 You, “Supreme Leader and the Military” 276–80. 
309 Chen, “Assessment of China’s Taiwan Policy,” 344–46. 
310 Christensen, “PRC Security Relations with the United States,” 4–5. 
 92 
The United States also played a role in shaping the PRC’s response in this period 
by quickly denying any support for Taiwanese independence and criticizing both Lee 
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian for their remarks.311 This helped to reassure the CCP that 
reunification was not being threatened by a U.S.-Taiwan plot. The CCP was also better at 
interpreting U.S. statements and actions, having learned through increase interactions 
with Washington.312 
E. CONCLUSION 
Compared to the 1950s, China in the 1990s and 2000s was distinctly more 
peaceful. The PRC faced challenges to its claim over Taiwan in 1995–1996 and 1999–
2002, yet did not resort to artillery bombardment as it did under Mao. China’s 
transformation into an economic powerhouse with deep trade ties to the United States and 
the world definitely played a role in shaping Beijing’s reactions to concerning cross-strait 
situations. CCP leaders, especially Jiang Zemin and other moderates, regularly 
demonstrated that economic growth through trade was an important consideration when 
deciding how to manage the threat of Taiwanese independence. Interestingly, in the later 
period of Jiang’s tenure, Beijing became more confident about cross-strait relations 
despite separatist rhetoric in Taipei because Taiwan had become so economically 
dependent on the mainland. China’s economic interdependence with the United States 
clearly mattered to Beijing’s decision making, especially leading up to and during the 
third TSC. China’s EI seems to have played less of a role in the differences in action 
between 1995–1996 and 1999–2002 since it was largely the same between the two 
periods. Taiwan’s economic dependence, on the other hand, did factor into China’s 
calculus, as it gave Beijing a sense of confidence of its economic leverage over Taipei 
while also reducing the short-term possibility of Taiwanese independence.  
However, it also appears that the CCP’s shift to consensus-based governing also 
mattered. Throughout most of the 1990s, the hawkish faction of the CCP consistently 
pressed for harsh actions against Taiwanese separatism, yet the PRC only used military 
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force during the third TSC. Even then, the bout of coercive diplomacy appears to have 
been decided after Jiang and other CCP moderates became convinced that their 
conciliatory approach to Taiwan was not working. At all other times during Jiang’s rule, 
the moderate view towards cross-strait relations won out, restraining hawkish voices from 
driving China’s policy. Comparing 1995–1996 with 1999–2002, however, the 
relationship between consensus governing and China’s foreign policy aggressiveness 
becomes more complicated. The transition to dispersed political power did lead to an 
overall less assertive approach to cross-strait relations. However, another dynamic also 
comes into play when China’s leader does not have a secure political position that might 
lead to more hawkish foreign policies. It should be noted that politically insecure leaders 
are more likely in a consensus-governance paradigm, since there is an aversion to 
consolidated political power. The more the PRC’s top leader has to foster consensus, the 
more he will need to accommodate other CCP and PLA elites’ desires and policy 
preferences, including calls for more muscular policies towards Taiwan (or other points 
of conflict). On the other hand, the more secure the Chinese leader’s position, the less 
susceptible he is to hawkish pressures.313 
Related to the CCP’s transition to consensus-based governing and more 
institutionalized politics, it seems that Deng Xiaoping’s shift to peaceful reunification 
vis-à-vis Taiwan set a policy baseline for all future PRC leaders. Much like Deng’s 
deliberate efforts to transform the CCP away from personality cults and one-man 
consolidated power has left a lasting legacy on Chinese politics, his approach to cross-
strait relations seems to persist. Peaceful reunification appears to be the default policy 
from which more coercive and militarized actions towards Taiwan are evaluated. 
Compared to China’s Taiwan policy under Mao, who much preferred to use military 
force and frequently advocated for the “Liberation of Taiwan,” Jiang’s China seems to 
have considered using military force as a move away from the norm. Analysis on Deng’s 
leadership era is outside of the scope of this thesis, but it definitely seems to have 
affected the 1990s and 2000s, so it bears mentioning. 
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Overall, the shift within the CCP from consolidated reign to consensus-based 
governing was important in determining Beijing’s approach to cross-strait relations in the 
1990s and 2000s. Despite facing threats to reunification on several instances, the 
mainland for the most part maintained a peaceful approach to Taiwan. Only during the 
third TSC did China opt to use military force as coercive diplomacy. Even then, in 
contrast with Mao’s artillery diplomacy of the 1950s, the 1995–1996 demonstrations 
were calculated for political effect and to minimize the risk of causing actual damage. 
Beijing also took deliberate steps to reassure the United States that the exercises were not 
a precursor to war. Outside of the third TSC, the PRC kept its responses to Taiwanese 
separatism on the political and economic levels and refrained from using military force. 
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IV. THESIS CONCLUSION 
The differences in China’s foreign policy in the 1950s, 1990s, and early 2000s are 
stark, especially vis-à-vis core interests such as the unification of Taiwan. While many 
factors have caused this change in China’s behavior, this thesis has identified two that are 
key: China’s domestic political structure and its economic interdependence (specifically 
with the United States and Taiwan). As the PRC has shift from paramount leader rule to 
consensus-based governance, it has become more restrained in how it responds to foreign 
policy challenges. In the 1990s, the CCP’s norm of maintaining policy consensus served 
to check hawkish policy-makers’ preferences. When China has chosen to use military 
force such as in the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, it did so in a very limited fashion in part 
because of its priority to maintain trade ties with the United States. Furthermore, in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, China did not respond to Taiwanese provocations with 
military force partially because of Taiwan’s increased economic dependence on the 
mainland. 
 Chapter II established that under the rule of a paramount leader, China was 
willing to quickly use deadly military force to address its political and security concerns. 
In 1950, China deployed massive forces to the Korean peninsula to rebuff the American-
led invasion of North Korea. In 1954, Beijing used artillery strikes on KMT-held islands 
Jinmen and Mazu to express its frustration at U.S. meddling in its domestic affairs and 
remind the world that it was serious about unifying Taiwan under CCP control, causing 
approximately 1,000 KMT and PLA casualties in the process. In 1958, the PRC fiercely 
bombarded Jinmen once again for two months with almost 3,000 killed in action on both 
sides. All three of these military actions undoubtedly had security and structural elements 
to them. The prospect of U.S. forces on the Yalu River would have been deeply 
concerning for the PRC regardless of who was in power in Beijing. Similarly, U.S. 
security assistance for the KMT represented a threat to reunification with Taiwan, and as 
such played a role in shaping China’s behavior in the 1950s Taiwan Strait Crises. 
However, how and when China responded to the challenges in these three situations, 
especially the Korean War and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, were driven by the PRC’s 
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paramount leader, Mao Zedong. He regularly demonstrated a propensity to use military 
force for political purposes, whether it be to demonstrate solidarity with the Middle East 
and mobilize people for Great Leap Forward in 1958 or to highlight China’s displeasure 
at U.S. assistance of the KMT in 1954. In Korea in 1950, Mao eagerly encouraged 
military intervention despite facing a far stronger opponent, exhibiting confidence in the 
PLA’s ability to prevail over American forces and sense of idealism about using military 
force. Most importantly, in all three cases, China’s actions closely matched Mao’s 
preferences despite being other CCP leaders’ disagreement. In 1950, in the face of 
vehement resistance from most of his colleagues and Chinese military leaders, Mao was 
successful in implementing a massive military operation on the Korean peninsula. In 
1954, soon after China had eased international tensions and gained positive recognition 
through Zhou Enlai’s work at the Geneva Conference, it agitated the Taiwan issue by 
initiating a round of artillery diplomacy against KMT islands. In 1958, after a period of 
relatively peaceful foreign policy led by Zhou, Mao recommenced shelling attacks on 
KMT offshore positions. 
After the 1958 crisis subsided, the PLA maintained steady but light artillery fire 
on Jinmen until 1979, when the United States switched its diplomatic recognition from 
the Republic of China to the PRC. Chapter III illustrated that China’s approach towards 
cross-strait relations has been largely peaceful. Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor as the 
paramount leader, was largely responsible for this initial shift in foreign policy by 
championing the idea of seeking peaceful reunification with Taiwan. He oversaw China’s 
economic opening with the world and set the PRC on its trajectory of growth. Deng also 
critically transitioned Chinese politics away from personalized rule, despite having 
almost Mao-like authority. By setting the CCP on the path to institutionalized and 
formalized politics, Deng reduced the likelihood of China’s foreign policy being dictated 
by one person in the future. This is the political context in which Jiang Zemin took power 
in 1989. Because of both the political changes implemented under Deng and Jiang’s own 
background as later generation CCP member, he was in a far less powerful position to 
unilaterally influence policy than either of his predecessors. In particular, Jiang had to 
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make efforts to maintain the support of the PLA, which was generally more hawkish 
towards cross-strait relations. 
As the PRC felt its way through a post-Cold War world, it sought amicable 
relations with the United States and increased trade ties to boost its own economy. 
China’s overall trade-to-GDP ratio steadily increased in this period, as did its bilateral 
economic interdependence (EI) with the United States and Taiwan. China strongly valued 
these trade ties, especially with the United States, as a source of economic prosperity. 
The rise of Taiwanese separatism and what China perceived as U.S. support for Taiwan’s 
independence in early 1990s began to threaten regional stability. Just as U.S. assistance 
of the KMT in the 1950s challenged the PRC’s claim over Taiwan and contributed to the 
first two TSCs, China considered the prospect of Taiwanese independence a significant 
threat to reunification. What appeared as U.S. support for Taiwan’s separatist streak 
exacerbated the issue. Starting with Washington’s sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan in 1992, 
the CCP and PLA began to split in opinions on how to respond to these concerns. 
Loosely, Beijing’s leadership coalesced around hawkish and moderate positions, with the 
PLA generally advocating for harsher action and Jiang and the MFA championing 
diplomatic responses while focusing on regional stability and promoting economic 
growth. After the F-16 sale, several PLA generals admonished the CCP for subverting 
sovereignty issues to economic goals. This highlights that the moderates were at least in 
part driven by EI in their policy making. Until mid-1995 when the Taiwan Strait Crisis 
began, the moderate approach won out in shaping the PRC’s cross-strait policy. Despite a 
trend of concerning Taiwanese behavior from 1993–1995, such as Lee Teng-hui’s 
attempts to earn U.N. recognition for Taiwan, his efforts at tradecraft with Southeast 
Asia, and Lee’s public implication that Taiwan was a separate nation, Beijing remained 
conciliatory. Notably, after all of Washington and Taipei’s problematic actions up to that 
point, in January 1995, Jiang Zemin announced his conciliatory “Eight Points” proposal 
for reunification negotiations. Lee’s response and his subsequent visit to the United 
States later that year demonstrated to Jiang and the moderates that their approach was not 
working, while encouraging PLA hawks of their position.  
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In face of increased pressure from the PLA to take more drastic action against 
Taiwan and the apparent failure of the moderate stance, the consensus within Beijing 
shifted to a hawkish position, leading Jiang to direct the military to begin demonstrative 
missile tests in June 1995. The crisis continued to escalate for the next several months 
until the end of Taiwan’s presidential election in March 1996. Importantly, while cross-
strait relations were tense and there were increased military forces in the region, China 
was conspicuously restrained in its use of military force to prevent any physical damage 
or harm to Taiwan. There was no evidence that the PLA was planning an amphibious 
invasion. Beijing also took deliberate steps to reassure the United States that the exercises 
were not a precursor to actual military operations. Even when facing a threat to Taiwan’s 
reunification, China was measured in its military response, likely in part because of 
Beijing’s overriding priority to maintain strong economic ties with the United States and 
the rest of the world. The CCP’s shift to consensus governance had a restraining effect on 
the PRC’s cross-strait policy in the years leading up to the third TSC. When China 
ultimately decided on using military force, economic interdependence considerations 
limited those actions to demonstrative exercises that carried low risks of causing physical 
damage or harm. 
From 1999–2002, Taiwan’s leaders’ actions once again threatened to destabilize 
the region with a series of public announcements that alluded to Taiwanese 
independence. China’s response was limited to harsh statements and no military action 
resulted. At this point, Jiang Zemin was more established in his political position and less 
vulnerable to PLA pressure. This was in part because two of the most hawkish and 
powerful generals had retired in 1997, but also because Jiang had made earnest efforts 
during his tenure to develop a rapport with PLA leadership. EI also shaped the PRC 
response, not in the manner that Russett and O’Neal describe in Triangulating Peace, but 
more in the style of Keohane and Nye in Power and Interdependence.314 China’s trade-
to-GDP with Taiwan or the United States had not changed significantly between 1995–
1996 and 1999–2002, as noted in the first section of Chapter III, but Taiwan’s economic 
dependence on China had increased massively between the two periods. Part of why the 
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PRC responded relatively conciliatorily was because it felt confident in its ability to 
inflict economic pain on Taiwan if needed. Taiwan’s increased dependence on China also 
made CCP leaders more confident that reunification would be possible eventually and at 
least in the short-term, independence was highly unlikely. Lastly, the United States was 
far quicker in condemning Taipei’s separatist rhetoric compared to before the 1995–1996 
Taiwan Strait Crisis. By disavowing support for Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian’s 
comments, Washington helped dispel any fears that it was working with Taipei to deepen 
its separation from the mainland. 
While this thesis did not examine Hu Jintao’s rule, the ten years of peaceful cross-
strait relations during his tenure bears some mention. Taiwan’s economic dependence on 
China continued to increase during this time period, strengthening Beijing’s confidence 
about eventual reunification.315 While EI does seem to play a role, it is less clear whether 
consensus-governing constrained Beijing’s behavior. This is in large part because there 
were less overt challenges to reunification, negating the need for any response. Taiwan’s 
independence-oriented streak had petered out, as demonstrated by the KMT’s shift away 
from the Lee-era separatism, and flagging voter popularity for the pro-independence 
DPP.316 In 2008, anti-independence KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the presidency 
promising an improvement in cross-strait relations, which was very reassuring to Beijing. 
Notably, China seems to have learned that any assertive actions during Taiwanese 
elections could backfire and increase voter support for pro-independence candidates.317 
In addition, the United States continued to reassure China that it did not support 
Taiwanese independence while mostly strengthening Sino-American relations.318 
Xi Jinping’s rule challenges this thesis’ argument more. He has consolidated more 
power than any Chinese leader since Mao, yet cross-strait relations have remained mostly 
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calm.319 Some of that is a carryover from the Hu period, as Ma held the Taiwanese 
presidency until March 2016. The CCP also continues to see economic growth and trade 
ties as priority, which might explain why China has maintained a steady and calm 
approach to Taiwan. However, Tsai Ing-wen’s more pro-independence administration 
since March 2016 has presented concerns, and Beijing has consequently increased its 
diplomatic pressure on Taipei.320 Tsai has refused to confirm Taiwan’s adherence the 
1992 Consensus321 an affirmation that all her predecessors since Lee Teng-hui had made, 
prompting the PRC to sever all cross-strait communications. Beijing has made it clear 
that it will not reopen any official communication channels with Taipei until Tsai 
endorses the 1992 Consensus.322 While this not the same level as the coercive diplomacy 
of 1995–1996, this does represent a tenser period of cross-strait relations than Jiang 
Zemin post-1996 or during Hu Jintao’s rule. Additional research that could yield insight 
into how Xi’s China will manage cross-strait relations going forward is Xi’s formative 
professional experiences. Mao’s experiences as a military and revolutionary leader were 
critical in shaping his perceptions and predispositions that were in turn pivotal to shaping 
China’s policies in the paramount leader period. Studies on Xi’s background and theories 
of warfare and politics might similarly help explain and predict Beijing’s behavior in the 
coming years. 
The U.S.-China relationship is extremely important for both countries, and 
ultimately the rest of the world. They represent the two largest economies and militaries 
(by defense spending dollars) in the world. The two powers are intertwined in terms of 
economic growth, while many opportunities for strategic competition and cooperation 
between Beijing and Washington exist simultaneously. It is in both countries’ interests to 
maintain stability in the region. Conflict, whether economic or military, would carry 
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immense costs for the United States, China, and the entire world. As such, it is relevant 
for American policy-makers and strategists to both understand the most likely points of 
tension, such as cross-strait relations, and the factors that shape China’s responses to core 
national interests, including threats to reunification. China’s increased economic 
interdependence has played a role in its more pacific foreign policy, which should 
encourage U.S. policy-makers to maintain strong trade ties with the PRC. In addition, 
seeing as the CCP’s shift from consolidated reign to consensus-based rule also had a 
restraining effect on Beijing’s foreign policy, American China watchers should be 
cognizant of indicators that the consensus-governance norm is being eroded. Xi Jinping is 
showing some signs of chipping away at this baseline, which, dependent on his policy 
preferences, may portend an increase in foreign policy assertiveness. If so, the United 
States needs to be prepared to respond firmly but carefully to deter aggression while 
avoiding unnecessary escalation of tensions in such an important strategic relationship. 
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